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Ending the Internal Affairs Farce
RACHEL MORAN†
INTRODUCTION
Trust between law enforcement agencies and the people they protect
and serve is essential in a democracy. It is key to the stability of our
communities, the integrity of our criminal justice system, and the safe
and effective delivery of policing services.1
I don’t trust the police because I can’t.2
On October 20, 2014, Chicago police officer Jason Van
Dyke, a white man, shot and killed Laquan McDonald, a
seventeen-year-old black teenager who had his back turned
when Van Dyke fired the first of sixteen shots.3 Van Dyke
continued to shoot even after McDonald lay writhing—and
dying—on the pavement.4 Five fellow police officers who
witnessed the shooting filed reports claiming that McDonald
was aggressively moving toward the officers when Van Dyke
shot him—claims that video footage from the incident
† Clinical Teaching Fellow, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; J.D.,
Chicago-Kent College of Law. I am thankful to many people for their thoughtful
insights during the writing process, most particularly Professors Christopher N.
Lasch and Robin Walker Sterling. I am also grateful to Professor Laurie Levenson
and Ron Safer for offering their insights and experience in combating police
misconduct. Any mistakes are my responsibility alone.
1. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT 1
(2015), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf.
2. Keith Reed, I Don’t Trust the Police Because I Can’t, EBONY (Sept. 18, 2013),
http://www.ebony.com/news-views/i-dont-trust-the-police-because-i-cant304#axzz3gXMPq6eE.
3. See Warning, Graphic Content: Laquan McDonald Shooting Dash-cam
Video, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/
breaking/ct-laquan-mcdonald-police-dashboard-short-video-premiumvideo.html;
see also Timothy Williams, Chicago Rarely Penalizes Officers for Complaints,
Data Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/19/us/
few-complaints-against-chicago-police-result-in-discipline-data-shows.html?smi
d=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur&_r=0.
4. See sources cited supra note 3.
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contradicts.5 The City of Chicago refused to release squad car
footage of the shooting for more than a year after McDonald’s
death, until a Cook County court finally ordered it do so.6
After the video was released and Van Dyke was charged with
first degree murder, Chicago residents learned that Van
Dyke had been named in eighteen prior civilian complaints
for incidents ranging from excessive force to racial slurs, and
not one of those prior complaints had ever been sustained.7
Mayor Rahm Emanuel demanded the resignations of both
the City’s police commissioner and the head of the review
board responsible for investigating police misconduct claims,
and pledged to “dramatically improv[e] our system of police
accountability.”8
One month after Laquan McDonald’s death, Timothy
Loehmann, a white police officer in Cleveland, shot and killed
Tamir Rice, a twelve-year-old African American boy who was
playing in the park with a toy gun.9 Loehmann, who killed
Tamir just seconds after arriving at the park in response to
a 911 call of a boy with a “probably fake” gun, had resigned
from his previous job as a police officer after experiencing a

5. Monica Davey, Officers’ Statements Differ from Video in Death of Laquan
McDonald, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/06/us/
officers-statements-differ-from-video-in-death-of-laquan-mcdonald.html?ribbonad-idx=4&rref=world&_r=0&module=ArrowsNav&contentCollection=
U.S.&action=swipe&region=FixedRight&pgtype=article.
6. See Jason Meisner & Jeremy Gorner, Chicago Forgoes Appeal After Judge
Orders Release of Video of Fatal Police Shooting, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 20, 2015),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-judge-orders-release-ofvideo-showing-fatal-shooting-by-police-officer-20151119-story.html.
7. Williams, supra note 3.
8. Jon Seidel, Police Review Authority Boss Ousted, CHI. SUN TIMES (Dec. 6,
2015), http://chicago.suntimes.com/news/7/71/1158836/police-review-authorityboss-ousted; accord Mitch Smith, Mayor of Chicago Announces Measures to Curb
Use of Deadly Force by the Police, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/12/31/us/mayor-rahm-emanuel-announces-measures-to-curbuse-of-deadly-force-by-chicago-police.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&smid=twnytimes&smtyp=cur.
9. Timothy Williams & Mitch Smith, Cleveland Officer Will Not Face Charges
in Tamir Rice Shooting Death, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/12/29/us/tamir-rice-police-shootiing-cleveland.html?smid=twnytimes&smtyp=cur&_r=0.
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“dangerous loss of composure” when handling firearms.10
More than a year after Tamir’s death, Cuyahoga County’s
chief prosecutor recommended that Loehmann not be
indicted for killing Tamir,11 but claimed that the lessons the
city learned from the case would ensure that “Tamir will not
have died in vain.”12 Cleveland’s mayor told his constituents
that city officials had done “a lot of soul searching” after
Tamir’s death, and promised that increasing accountability
for police misconduct would be a priority for his
administration.13
In April of 2015, North Charleston police officer Michael
Slager shot and killed Walter Scott, an unarmed African
American man, who was fleeing with his back to the officer
when Slager fired eight shots at him from behind.14 Slager,
who is white, had been named in a prior complaint for using
his taser on an African American man with no justification,
slamming the man to the ground, and dragging him away.15
Slager had also been cited in a separate incident for failing
to file a police report on behalf of an African American woman
who complained that her children were being harassed.16 An
internal investigation into the excessive force claim cleared
Slager within weeks without ever contacting the complainant

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Prosecutor McGinty Responds to NAACP Request for Tamir Rice Grand
Jury Documents, WKYC (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.wkyc.com/story/news/
local/cleveland/tamir-rice-shooting/2016/01/06/naacp-asks-grand-jurydocuments-tamir-rice-case/78373754.
13. Williams & Smith, supra note 9; Cleveland Mayor Frank Jackson on
Accountability, Police Reform and His Vision for the Future of Policing, NEWSONE
(Mar. 2015), http://newsone.com/3096051/cleveland-mayor-frank-jackson-onaccountability-police-reform-and-his-vision-for-the-future-of-policing-video.
14. Ashley Fantz & Holly Yan, Dash Cam Video Shows the Moments Before
South Carolina Police Shooting, CNN (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/
2015/04/09/us/south-carolina-police-shooting.
15. Ray Sanchez, Officer Michael Thomas Slager of South Carolina: What We
Know about Him, CNN (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/08/us/southcarolina-michael-slager.
16. Id.
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to obtain his side of the story.17 In the wake of national
outrage over Scott’s death, North Charleston’s mayor pledged
an independent investigation into the shooting, and promised
to order body cameras for the police force in order to improve
officer accountability.18
Police officers across the United States killed 2318 people
between January 1, 2014 and December 31, 2015.19 Several
of those victims—McDonald, Rice, Scott, Michael Brown, Eric
Garner, Akai Gurley, Freddie Gray, and Samuel DuBose, to
name just a few of the unarmed black men killed by police—
have in their deaths become the focal points of further public
outrage, protests, and rioting.20 In the wake of these tragic

17. Associated Press, Cop Who Shot Black Man in Back Had Earlier ExcessiveForce Complaint, N.Y. POST (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.nypost.com/
2018/04/09/cop-who-shot-black-man-had-prior-excessive-force-complaint-report/.
18. See Wesley Lowery & Mark Berman, In North Charleston, Urgent Promises
of Change to Avoid ‘Another Ferguson,’ WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-north-charleston-urgent-promisesof-change-to-avoid-another-ferguson/2015/04/08/659b16c2-de25-11e4-be40566e2653afe5_story.html.
19. See KILLED BY POLICE, http://killedbypolice.net/ (last visited May 30, 2016).
Because police departments are generally not required to report how many people
they have killed, and are often resistant to doing so, no precise governmental
statistics are available regarding these numbers. A group of Harvard Medical
Scientists recently called on U.S. public health agencies to make police killings a
“notifiable condition,” which would require police departments to report each
killing to their corresponding Public Health Department. See Dylan Sevett,
Harvard Medical Scientists Say Police Killings Should Be Recorded as Public
Epidemic, U.S. UNCUT (Dec. 27, 2015), http://usuncut.com/black-livesmatter/harvard-medical-police-killings-public-epidemic/.
20. See, e.g., Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s
Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/
nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html; J. David Goodman &
Vivian Yee, Officer Charged in Akai Gurley Case Debated Reporting Gunshot,
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/
12/nyregion/akai-gurley-shooting-death-arraignment.html;
Jack
Healy,
Ferguson, Still Tense, Grows Calmer, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/27/us/michael-brown-darren-wilson-fergusonprotests.html (discussing the public reaction to the shooting death of Michael
Brown); Dana Ford & Ed Payne, Ex-university Cop in Samuel DuBose Shooting
Death Pleads Not Guilty, CNN (July 31, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/
2015/07/30/us/ohio-sam-dubose-tensing; Michael Martinez, Report: Autopsy
Shows Freddie Gray Suffered ‘High-energy Injury,’ CNN (June 24, 2015),
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deaths, government officials have spouted many of the same
platitudes and promises for systemic change within police
departments, pledging to discipline abusive officers, increase
accountability, and review departmental policies on use of
force.21
These promises—and the travesties from which they
stem—are hardly new. After four Los Angeles Police
Department officers were caught on video viciously beating
Rodney King in 1991, the city of Los Angeles erupted into
race riots.22 Los Angeles mayor Tom Bradley pledged to
conduct an investigation into the police department’s
internal disciplinary system, assuring the public that “[t]he
men who beat Rodney King do not deserve to wear the
uniform of the L.A.P.D.”23 Further, U.S. Attorney General
Dick Thornburgh vowed to review every police brutality
complaint made to the federal government within the past

http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/23/us/baltimore-freddie-gray-death-officersindicted-pleas.
21. See, e.g., Chuck Raasch, U.S. Attorney General Announces New Civil Rights
Probe
in
Ferguson,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
(Sept.
5,
2014)
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/u-s-attorney-generalannounces-new-civil-rights-probe-in/article_d2cd8f72-69a2-5afe-bbe0-8e4dfb371
477.html (quoting Attorney General Eric Holder’s promise, after Michael Brown’s
shooting death, to open a “fair, thorough investigation” that would result in
“lasting, positive change” in the Ferguson Police Department); Andrew Tangel,
Civil-Rights Leaders Plan Washington March, New York City Mayor Vows Police
Changes, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2014) http://www.wsj.com/articles/mayor-bill-deblasio-promises-overhaul-at-nypd-after-eric-garner-case-1417704263
(quoting
New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio’s pledge, after Eric Garner’s death, to improve
police officer training, and Governor Andrew Cuomo’s pledge to “push for a review
of police training and procedures”); Garrett W. Haake, Baltimore Mayor Promises
Answers in Freddie Gray’s Death, WUSA9 (Apr. 20, 2015, 11:45 PM),
http://www.wusa9.com/story/news/2015/04/20/baltimore-mayor-promisesanswers-in-freddie-gray-death/26106533.
22. See George Holliday, Rodney King Beating Video Full Length Footage
Screener, YOUTUBE (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sb1W
ywIpUtY.
23. Seth Mydans, The Police Verdict; Los Angeles Policemen Acquitted in Taped
Beating, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/02/08/
home/rodney-verdict.html.

842

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

six years.24 In 1997, when New York Police Department
officers falsely arrested and tortured Abner Louima, a black
Haitian immigrant—injuring him so badly that he remained
hospitalized for two months25—Mayor Rudy Giuliani publicly
denounced the officers who attacked Louima, and the U.S.
Attorney for the Eastern District of New York promised to
“pull[] out the stops” in prosecuting the abusers.26 Louima
himself expressed hope that he would become a “symbol for
change” in the way police officers treated minorities.27 After
Atlanta police officers shot and killed ninety-two-year-old
Kathryn Johnston in 2006, and then planted drugs in her
home in an attempt to cover up their misdeeds, the U.S.
Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia promised that
his office would begin investigating a “culture of misconduct”
within the Atlanta Police Department,28 and the Department
of Justice (DOJ) issued a press release announcing that
officers who ignored the Constitution could expect to be
“vigorously prosecut[ed].”29 And just two years before twelveyear-old Tamir Rice’s killing, a group of thirteen Cleveland
police officers fired 137 shots at Timothy Russell and Malissa
Williams, killing the unarmed African American couple who
had failed to pull over after a turn signal violation.30 After
24. Neil A. Lewis, Police Brutality Under Wide Review by Justice Dept., N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/
big/0303.html; Mydans, supra note 23.
25. Sewell Chan, The Abner Louima Case, 10 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES: CITY
ROOM (Aug. 9, 2007), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/09/the-abnerlouima-case-10-years-later.
26. Marie Brenner, Incident in the 70th Precinct, VANITY FAIR (Jan. 16, 2007,
12:00 AM), http://www.vanityfair.com/magazine/1997/12/louima199712.
27. Id.
28. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Three Atlanta Police Officers Charged
in Connection with the Fatal Shooting of an Elderly Atlanta Woman (Apr. 26,
2007), http://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/gan/press/2007/04-26-07.pdf.
29. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Three Former Atlanta Police Officers
Sentenced to Prison in Fatal Shooting of Elderly Atlanta Woman (Feb. 24, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-former-atlanta-police-officers-sentencedprison-fatal-shooting-elderly-atlanta-woman.
30. See, e.g., Matt Schiavenza, ‘This is Straight Murder’: A Troubling Acquittal
in Cleveland, THE ATLANTIC (May 23, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/
archive/2015/05/this-is-straight-murder-a-troubling-acquittal-in-cleveland/394
058; Not Guilty: Judge Acquits Cleveland Ptl. Michael Brelo on All Counts,

2016]

THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS FARCE

843

their deaths, the Cleveland police chief assured residents
that the department would “make sure that any and all
violations of our policies and procedures will be dealt with.”31
The tragedy of minorities—particularly black men—
being killed, abused, or harassed at the hands of police
officers has long been and continues to be one of the great
civil rights crises for our country. Although the legal
community has known of and periodically wrung its hands
about the policing problem for decades, we have made little
progress in solving it. As lawyers, uniquely situated to
influence or even dictate the practices of law enforcement, we
should have a “capacity for moral indignation at injustice”
that prompts us to seek lasting solutions to the ongoing
outrage of abusive officers.32
This Article focuses on one aspect of solving the police
misconduct crisis: changing how cities review, and respond
to, citizen complaints about police misconduct. When
misconduct goes unchecked, it alienates the very people the
police are intended to serve, allows bad officers to thrive, and
creates a fertile breeding ground for the abuses that the more
vulnerable members of our society—especially poor
minorities—have suffered for decades.33
The first purpose of this Article is to show that internal
affairs review—in which the police department itself reviews
NEWSNET5 (June 4, 2015, 6:29 PM), http://www.newsnet5.com/news/localnews/cleveland-metro/verdict-in-judge-to-announce-decision-in-cleveland-policeofficer-michael-brelos-case.
31. Jason Hanna et al., Cleveland Officer Not Guilty in Killing Unarmed Pair,
CNN (May 23, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/23/us/cleveland-police-verdict.
32. I borrow this phrase from Stephen Wizner, Beyond Skills Training, 7
CLINICAL L. REV. 327, 330 (2001).
33. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROMOTING COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES TO REDUCE
RACIAL PROFILING 21 (2008) (“Being viewed as fair and just is critical to successful
policing in a democracy. When the police are perceived as unfair in their
enforcement, it will undermine their effectiveness.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 2, 15 (2015),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/
2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf
[hereinafter
FERGUSON
INVESTIGATION] (noting that Ferguson’s pattern of “unconstitutional policing,”
which has gone unpunished for years, has “undermin[ed] law enforcement
legitimacy among African Americans in particular”).
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claims of misconduct by officers within the force—is an
irresponsible and, frankly, farcical method of responding to
misconduct claims.34 To echo scholar Walter Katz, the
“system of internalized criminal investigations has been
criticized for years for its inherent bias.”35 Repeated incidents
of police misconduct, and the near-total failure of internal
review systems to hold officers accountable for that
misconduct, “perverts the rule of law, makes citizens
distrustful of authority, and encourages further lawlessness
by police officers.”36 Saying internal affairs units are the best
means of protecting citizens from police misconduct is like
saying foxes are the best guards for the henhouse—a notion
even small children have found laughable for centuries.37
The other bookend to this Article is one which remains
largely unexplored by legal scholars: if we are to end the
internal affairs farce, what review system should replace it?
Many cities, recognizing the futility of relying on police
34. The argument could be made that internal affairs review serves exactly the
purpose it was intended to accomplish, as it was never actually intended to correct
police misconduct, but rather to simply stave off and obfuscate civilian attempts
at holding officers accountable. This is a topic for another piece. For now, I assume
that readers actually want to solve the problem of police misconduct.
35. Walter Katz, Enhancing Accountability and Trust with Independent
Investigations of Police Lethal Force, 128 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 235, 238 (2015);
see also, e.g., John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police Misconduct, 2000 WIS. L. REV.
789, 792-802 (2000); Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for
Reform, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001); Kami Chavis Simmons, Cooperative
Federalism and Police Reform: Using Congressional Spending to Promote Police
Accountability, 62 ALA. L. REV. 351, 353-54 (2011).
36. Jacobi, supra note 35, at 802-03; see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF
CONN., PROTECT, SERVE AND LISTEN: ACCEPTING CIVILIAN COMPLAINTS AT
CONNECTICUT POLICE DEPARTMENTS 1 (2012), https://www.acluct.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/12/protectservelisten.pdf (“Effective law enforcement
depends on public trust in the police, which rests in large part on fair and
transparent systems for handling civilian complaints of police misconduct.”);
Christopher R. Green, Reverse Broken Windows, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 265, 271
(2015) (“Officers who feel they can get away with unnecessarily harsh conduct or
unjustifiably racially disparate patterns are more likely to feel they can get away
with violating more serious norms.”).
37. See Elyse Bruce, Fox in the Henhouse, HISTORICALLY SPEAKING (MAR. 6,
2013), https://idiomation.wordpress.com/tag/fox-in-the-henhouse (tracing the
origins of the “fox guarding the henhouse” proverb to a children’s nursery rhyme,
a 1589 publication, and the Book of Luke in the New Testament Bible).
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departments to police themselves, have attempted to
institute various forms of civilian oversight.38 For the most
part, these have met with limited success. This is, I believe,
one of the reasons cities still default to internal review:
because figuring out how to staff, structure, and implement
an effective independent review system is just too daunting.
This Article addresses the crisis of unchecked police
misconduct in four parts. Part I details the appalling rate at
which police officers in the United States kill, injure, abuse,
or otherwise mistreat the people—in most cases, minorities—
they have sworn to protect. Part II explains how internal
review systems have allowed misconduct to flourish. Part III
discusses the various independent review systems that some
cities have adopted, and why they have, on the whole, had
only marginal success in deterring police misconduct. In Part
IV, I propose a model for what an effective independent
review agency could look like—which actors should be
included in the independent review agency, how the agency
should be structured, and what kind of authority the agency
should possess.
I. THE EFFECTS OF POLICE MISCONDUCT ON COMMUNITIES OF
COLOR
Police officers in the United States kill their constituents
at a stunning rate. In the first twenty-four days of 2015, U.S.
police officers killed fifty-nine people—well over two per day,
and four more than police officers in England and Wales
killed in the last twenty-four years combined.39 In March of
2015, U.S. police officers killed ninety-seven people, or three
more than Australian police killed over the twenty-year
period from 1992 through 2011.40 Even in Utah—hardly
38. A list of many of the civilian oversight agencies in the country can be found
on the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement
(NACOLE) website. See Agency Profiles, NAT’L ASS’N FOR CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT, https://nacole.org/nacole-resources/oversight-agencies/linksto-oversight-agencies-u-s (last visited May 26, 2016).
39. Jamiles Lartey, By the Numbers: US Police Kill More in Days Than Other
Countries Do in Years, THE GUARDIAN (June 9, 2015), http://www.theguardian.
com/us-news/2015/jun/09/the-counted-police-killings-us-vs-other-countries.
40. Id.
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known as an epicenter of police violence—fifteen percent of
homicides from 2010 to 2014 were committed by police
officers.41
The victims of police killings are disproportionately
minorities. African Americans represent just thirteen
percent of the U.S. population but account for over thirty
percent of people killed by police.42 Between 2010 and 2014,
unarmed black people were 3.49 times more likely to be shot
by police than unarmed white people.43 The number is
drastically higher in certain large counties: in Miami-Dade
County, unarmed black people were twenty-two times more
likely to be shot by police than unarmed white people, and in
the counties that encompass Los Angeles and New Orleans,
unarmed black people were ten and nine times more likely,
respectively, to be victims of police shootings than their white
counterparts.44 In Cook County, Illinois, which includes the
city of Chicago, unarmed black people were five times more
likely to be shot by police than armed white people.45 In
almost every county in the country, unarmed victims of police
41. Erin Alberty, Killings by Utah Police Outpacing Gang, Drug, Child-Abuse
Homicides, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Nov. 23, 2014), http://www.sltrib.com/
news/1842489-155/killings-by-utah-police-outpacing-gang.
42. Sendhil Mullainathan, Police Killings of Blacks: Here is What the Data
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/18/upshot/
police-killings-of-blacks-what-the-data-says.html?_r=0. The disproportionate
representation of minorities as targets of police suspicions plays out across the
spectrum of the justice system. See generally, e.g., Loïc Wacquant, Class, Race &
Hyperincarceration in Revanchist America, DÆDALUS, Summer 2010, at 74, 74
(discussing how the police, courts, and corrections system have systematically
targeted the “black underclass” for decades); Robynn J.A. Cox, Where Do We Go
from Here? Mass Incarceration and the Struggle for Civil Rights, ECON. POL’Y
INST. (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.epi.org/files/2014/MassIncarcerationReport.pdf.
43. Cody T. Ross, The United States Police-Shooting Database: A Multi-Level
Bayesian Analysis of Racial Bias in Police Shootings at the County-Level in the
United States, 2011-2014, at 5 (Dec. 8, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2534673. These records included both police
shootings that killed their victims, and shootings where the victims survived.
44. Id.; see also Officer Involved: A KPCC Investigation Into Police Shootings
in Los Angeles County, KPCC, http://projects.scpr.org/officer-involved/#12 (last
visited May 26, 2016) (discussing how law enforcement officers in Los Angeles
County fatally shot black people at triple the rate of white people).
45. Ross, supra note 43, at 5.
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shootings were much more likely to be black or Hispanic than
white.46 The statistics are even worse for young black men:
during the years 2010 through 2012, black teenagers
between the ages of fifteen and nineteen were twenty-one
times more likely to be killed by police than their white
counterparts.47
Shootings are not the only kind of terror police officers
inflict on minorities. Recent investigations by the DOJ’s Civil
Rights Division have revealed that officers in many cities use
unconstitutionally excessive force during their encounters
with minorities,48 stop and frisk minorities without any legal
justification,49 systematically arrest and charge minorities
46. Id. at 7.
47. Ryan Gabrielson et al., Deadly Force, In Black and White, PROPUBLICA
(Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.propublica.org/article/deadly-force-in-black-andwhite. This statistic is drawn from FBI data for the years 2010-2012. Id.
48. See, e.g., FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 33, at 5, 28 (“Nearly 90% of
documented force used by FPD officers was used against African Americans.”);
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND DIVISION OF POLICE 1224
(2014),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/
attachments/2014/12/04/cleveland_division_of_police_findings_letter.pdf
[hereinafter CLEVELAND INVESTIGATION], (detailing patterns of excessive force by
Cleveland police officers); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW
ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT 3-9 (2011), https://s3.amazonaws.com/
s3.documentcloud.org/documents/74332/justice-department-report-on-the-neworleans.pdf [hereinafter NEW ORLEANS INVESTIGATION] (discussing “use of
unreasonable force” by New Orleans police officers).
49. New York City’s stop-and-frisk policy, which a federal court found to have
disproportionately targeted and impacted minorities, is perhaps the most wellknown example of this. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 557
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding NYC’s stop-and-frisk policy unconstitutional, and noting
that the people subjected to stops were “overwhelmingly people of color, and they
are justifiably troubled to be singled out when many of them have done nothing
to attract the unwanted attention”); see also FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note
33, at 18 (describing Ferguson Police Department’s pattern of “suspicionless,
legally unsupportable stops” of African American residents); Nicole Flatow, If You
Thought Stop-and-Frisk Was Bad, You Should Know About Jump-Outs, THINK
PROGRESS
(Dec.
10,
2014),
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2014/12/
10/3468340/jump-outs. “Jump-out” is the colloquial term many Washington, D.C.
residents use to describe unmarked police cars whose occupants conduct surprise
stops and frisks of unsuspecting residents. According to Flatow, jump-outs are
“for many black residents the mark of policing problems in the nation’s capital:
militaristic, seemingly arbitrary, and reeking of racial disparity.” Id.; U.S. DEP’T.
OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT 2, 16 (2014),
https://perma.cc/PE2D-2LBG?type=pdf [hereinafter NEWARK INVESTIGATION]
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for nonviolent crimes far more aggressively than they enforce
similar crimes in white communities,50 and arrest poor
minorities—subjecting many of them to jail time—for minor
unpaid fines.51
Not surprisingly, the relationship between police
departments and minority communities has been fraught
with tension for years. Gallup polls conducted biannually
since 1985 show that, over the past thirty years, consistently
less than one-half of surveyed minorities nationwide express
confidence that the police will either serve or protect them,
and many believe that the police would be willing to use
excessive force on them.52 Sadly, this fear is justified: as civil
rights scholar Kami Chavis Simmons has written:
(finding that the Newark Police Department stops minorities at a far greater rate
than whites, often with no constitutional justification).
50. FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 33, at 4-5 (noting that Ferguson
police enforced certain minor offenses, such as traffic offenses or failure to comply
with police orders, “almost exclusively” against African Americans); see also Alec
Karakatsanis, Policing, Mass Imprisonment, and the Failure of American
Lawyers, 128 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 253, 256 (2015) (“If nonviolent criminal laws
were enforced on college campuses or investment banks for just a single day in
the same rates as in poor communities, there would be twenty-four-hour news
vans outside of every local jail and immediate public hearings about the
harshness and efficacy of our legal system.”); Flatow, supra note 49 (noting that
black people in Washington, D.C. were, as of 2014, eight times more likely than
white people to be arrested for marijuana possession).
51. See FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 33, at 2-4 (describing how the
Ferguson police department’s emphasis on generating city revenue by ticketing
citizens, and arresting them for unpaid fines, “raise[s] due process concerns and
inflict[s] unnecessary harm on members of the Ferguson community”); id. at 2
(“[M]any officers appear to see some residents, especially those who live in
Ferguson’s predominantly African-American neighborhoods, less as constituents
to be protected than as potential offenders and sources of revenue.”);
Karakatsanis, supra note 50, at 262-63 (discussing the rise of “modern debtors’
prisons” in which local police routinely arrest and incarcerate poor people for
failing to pay fines they cannot afford to pay); see generally AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS PRISONS (Oct. 2010)
(discussing the incarceration of defendants unable to pay their legal debts).
52. Justin McCarthy, Nonwhites Less Likely to Feel Police Protect and Serve
Them, GALLUP (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/179468/nonwhitesless-likely-feel-police-protect-serve.aspx. While the percentage of white people
who expressed confidence in the police has risen as high as seventy-two percent
during this same time period, the percentage of minorities expressing the same
confidence has never been over fifty-two percent, and has fallen as low as thirty-
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[i]f the distrust among minority communities was simply due to
misperceptions or unsubstantiated allegations of police bias, it
might be easier to develop solutions to ease this distrust.
Unfortunately, empirical evidence supports the notion that African
Americans’ perceptions of mistreatment and differential treatment
by the criminal-justice system are in fact substantiated.53

A report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights backs
up this claim, noting that poor people and minorities have
consistently borne the brunt of police brutality, harassment,
and misconduct.54 The report concluded, “[i]n their eagerness
to achieve important goals such as lowering crime, some
police officers overstep their authority, trample on
individuals’ civil rights, and may cause entire communities
to fear the same people they hired and trusted to protect
them.”55 Violence directed toward poor minorities has been a
“common characteristic of police abuse in America” for
decades.56
three percent. Id.; see also Jens Manuel Krogstad, Latino Confidence in Local
Police Lower Than Among Whites, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 28, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/08/28/latino-confidence-in-localpolice-lower-than-among-whites (concluding that Hispanics are significantly less
likely than white people to express confidence in the ability of the police to treat
races equally, avoid excessive force, or do “a good job enforcing the law”).
53. Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the “New Paradigm” of Police
Accountability: A Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 373,
412-13 (2010).
54. Revisiting Who Is Guarding the Guardians?, U.S. COMM’N ON C.R. (2000),
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/guard/exsum.htm.
55. Id.
56. Levenson, supra note 35, at 13; see also FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra
note 33, at 5 (“[D]istrust of the Ferguson Police Department is longstanding and
largely attributable to Ferguson’s approach to law enforcement.”); NEWARK
INVESTIGATION, supra note 49, at 17 (“Newark’s black residents bear the brunt of
the NPD’s pattern of unconstitutional policing. This undeniable experience of
being disproportionately affected by the NPD’s unconstitutional policing helps
explain the community distrust and cynicism that undermines effective policing
in Newark.”); Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and
Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 515
(2003) (“[S]tudies of public views about the police typically reveal large racial and
ethnic group differences, with minority group members expressing much more
negative attitudes about the police and having lower trust and confidence in
institutions of social control.”); Jeremy Travis et al., Exploring the Role of the
Police in Prisoner Reentry, NEW PERSP. POLICING BULL., (Nat’l Inst. of Justice)

850

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

Even the financial costs of police misconduct have not,
thus far, inspired cities to reform their police departments’
treatment of minorities. Over the last decade, Chicago has
spent more than $520 million on lawsuits related to police
misconduct claims, many of which involved claims of
maltreatment of African Americans.57 In fiscal year 2012
alone, New York City paid a staggering $152 million in tort
claims, which include misconduct and civil rights violations,
against the New York City Police Department.58 In 2015,
Baltimore reached a $6.4 million settlement over the death
of twenty-five-year-old Freddie Gray, a black man, while in
police custody.59 Cleveland paid $3 million to the families of
Timothy Russell and Malissa Williams, the unarmed African

July 2012, at 3, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/238337.pdf (noting that in
some communities, cooperation with police is considered “tantamount to working
with the enemy”). Although the victims of police shootings are generally men,
minority women have also long borne the brunt of police brutality. See, e.g., Zoe
Carpenter, The Police Violence We Aren’t Talking About, THE NATION (Aug. 27,
2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/police-violence-we-arent-talking-about;
Chaédria Labouvier, How Many Viral Videos Will It Take? Another Reminder of
the Vulnerability of the Black Girl in America, ELLE (Oct. 28, 2015),
http://www.elle.com/culture/career-politics/a31527/do-we-need-another-video-toremind-us-that-black-girls-are-the-most-vulnerable (“Do we need more videos of
black girls dragged across school floors and front lawns to know that this is how
black women are treated when they have the misfortune of encountering the
police and the white male rage that so often seems part and parcel of the job?”);
Erick A. Paulino, Deconstructing the Arrest of Sandra Bland, THE FEMINIST WIRE
(Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.thefeministwire.com/2015/08/deconstructing-thearrest-of-sandra-bland (“in challenging . . . police brutality against people of
color, #BlackLivesMatter activism must pay particular attention to how police
exercise force differently for men and women”).
57. Andrew Schroedter, Beyond Burge, BETTER GOV’T ASS’N (Apr. 3, 2014),
http://www.bettergov.org/beyond_burge/; see also Mitch Smith & Monica Davey,
Chicago to Pay $5 Million to Victims of Police Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/07/us/chicago-to-pay-5-million-to-victims-ofpolice-abuse.html?_r=0.
58. JOHN C. LIU, CITY OF NEW YORK: OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, CLAIMS
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 5, 43, 44 chart 18 (2013), http://comptroller.nyc.gov/
wp-content/uploads/documents/2013_Claims-Report.pdf.
59. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Baltimore Announces $6.4 Million Settlement in the
Death of Freddie Gray, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/09/09/us/freddie-gray-baltimore-police-death.html?smid=twbna&_r=0.
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American couple who police officers shot at 137 times,60 and
reached a separate settlement with the DOJ over patterns of
abusive policing.61 The Albuquerque Police Department was
ordered to pay $4.25 million to the estate of a man killed by
Albuquerque police officers,62 and, in a separate case, the City
of Albuquerque was found liable for $10 million in damages
to the estate of a military veteran shot and killed by police.63
The City of Charlotte, North Carolina settled a wrongful
death lawsuit brought by the family of Jonathan Ferrell, a
black man killed by a white police officer, for $2.25 million.64
Many other cities are paying the heavy costs of defending
their police departments against civil rights lawsuits alleging
patterns and practices of abusive policing.65

60. CLEVELAND INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at 9.
61. Mitch Smith & Matt Apuzzo, Cleveland Reaches Settlement with Justice
Department over Police Conduct, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/us/cleveland-police.html?_r=0.
62. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF ALBUQUERQUE POLICE
DEPARTMENT 11 (2014), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/apd_
findings_4-10-14.pdf [hereinafter ALBUQUERQUE INVESTIGATION]. In 2013 the
Albuquerque Police Department settled another case, involving the death of
another man at the hands of Albuquerque police officers, for $900,000. Id. at 12.
63. Id. at 13.
64. Jonathan M. Katz, Trial Opens for Charlotte Officer Who Fatally Shot
Black
Motorist
Seeking
Help,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
3,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/04/us/trial-opens-for-charlotte-officer-whofatally-shot-black-motorist-seeking-help.html. The criminal trial against Ferrell’s
killer ended in a hung jury, and the Charlotte prosecutor’s office has announced
that it has no intention of retrying the officer. Jonathan Katz, No Retrial for North
Carolina Officer Who Killed Unarmed Man, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/29/us/jonathan-ferrell-policeshooting.html?_r=0.
65. See e.g., Velazquez v. City of Long Beach, 793 F.3d 1010, 1028 (9th Cir.
2015) (reversing grant of summary judgment motion in favor of city, and finding
that reasonable jury could have found that City of Long Beach was “aware that
[a police officer] had previously used excessive force when making arrests, but
had taken no steps to curb his propensity”); Noble v. City of Camden, 112 F. Supp.
3d 208, 222 (D.N.J. 2015) (finding that plaintiff in a § 1983 lawsuit “provided
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the City [of
Camden] was deliberately indifferent in investigating claims of excessive force”
by police officers); Galindez v. Miller, 285 F. Supp. 2d 190, 197-99 (D. Conn. 2003)
(denying summary judgment for similar reasons).
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Identifying the problem is one thing; fixing it is another.
After decades of violent policing, periodic protests, and calls
for reform, our country still wrestles with the same issues,
and can point to little or no progress. Just one recent example
of the grave disconnect between police departments and
many people of color is the hashtag #IfIDieInPoliceCustody,
which began trending on Twitter in July of 2015 after the
suspicious death of Sandra Bland, an African American
woman who had been arrested after a minor traffic violation,
and died while in custody of the Waller County, Texas
Sheriff’s Office.66 In Los Angeles, protesters recently made
news for disrupting meetings of the Los Angeles Police
Commission, demanding greater transparency in officer useof-force investigations and appointment of a community
activist to the Police Commission.67 Movements like Black
Lives Matter are demanding policing reform in nearly every
major city across the country.68 But when citizens complain
66. See, e.g., Taryn Finley, #IfIDieInPoliceCustody: Twitter Responds to
Sandra Bland’s Death with Heartbreaking Hashtag, HUFFINGTON POST (July 17,
2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/twitter-responds-to-the-suspiciousn
ess-of-sandra-blands-death-with-ifidieinpolicecustody_55a8feeee4b04740a3dfa
386. Some of the tweets included: “#IfIDieInPoliceCustody tell them I sagged my
pants, smoked weed, and wore hoodies. Ask them if those things warranted my
execution.” @See_Say_92, TWITTER (July 16, 2015, 4:57 PM) https://
twitter.com/See_Say_92/status/621831095911251968?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw;
“#IfIDieInPoliceCustody Don’t call for peace. Call for action.” @MalePocahontas,
TWITTER, (July 16, 2015, 5:29 PM), https://twitter.com/MalePocahontas
/status/621839019899355136?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw;
and
“#IfIDieInPolice
Custody my murderer will go free & America will blame me” @Fiorentina5,
TWITTER (Dec. 28, 2015, 1:31 PM), https://twitter.com/Fiorentina5/
status/681588213941587968. The trooper who arrested Bland was later charged
with perjury, for filing an affidavit claiming that he removed Bland from her car
only in order to conduct a safe traffic stop investigation. See David Montgomery,
Texas Trooper Who Arrested Sandra Bland Is Charged with Perjury, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 6, 2016), http://mobile.nytimes.com/2016/01/07/us/texas-grand-jury-sandrabland.html?smid=tw-bna&referer=https://t.co/3xXvrUWSmv.
67. Times Editorial Bd., Police Commission Must Stop Stonewalling Activists,
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-policecommission-chaos-20151005-story.html.
68. There is reason to believe that these movements are gaining political
power. Anita Alvarez and Timothy McGinty, the Cook County and Cuyahoga
County prosecutors who dragged their feet in prosecuting the police officers who
killed Laquan McDonald and Tamir Rice, respectively, have since both been voted
out of office, during elections dominated by opponents who vocalized disgust over
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of misconduct by police officers, the primary mechanism for
reviewing those claims is still, in most cities, to entrust them
to internal affairs units within police departments. These
units fall woefully short of fulfilling their duties to
investigate, punish, and deter misconduct.
II. THE FARCE OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS
In his book Between the World and Me, Ta-Nehisi Coates
writes of a police officer in Prince Georges County, Maryland,
who killed an unarmed black man: “[the] officer, given
maximum power, bore minimum responsibility. He was
charged with nothing. He was punished by no one. He was
returned to his work.”69 The phenomenon Coates describes—
an armed officer who, having sworn to protect a community,
instead shoots and kills one of its members without
repercussion—is devastatingly familiar to many minorities.70
The ability of officers to commit violent acts with impunity is
due in no small part to internal review systems that routinely
turn their backs to police misconduct.
Internal review refers to the practice of relying on police
officers—typically working in a unit known as Internal
Affairs—to handle investigations into alleged misconduct by
other officers within the same department.71 For most police
the lack of governmental response to these shootings. See Claire Landsbaum,
Prosecutor Anita Alvarez Loses Chicago Reelection in Wake of Laquan McDonald
Controversy, NY MAG. (Mar. 16, 2016), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/
2016/03/chicago-prosecutor-anita-alvarez-ousted.html#; Jane Morice, The Nation
Reacts to Ouster of Tamir Rice Prosecutor Timothy J. McGinty, CLEVELAND.COM
(Mar. 16, 2016, 4:52 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2016/03/
the_nation_reacts_to_ouster_of.html.
69. TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 80 (2015).
70. For example, Richard Haste, the white New York Police Department officer
who shot and killed seventeen-year-old Ramarley Graham, an unarmed African
American teenager, has since been promoted and received $25,000 in pay
increases in the four years since he killed Graham. NYPD Officer Who Shot
Unarmed Ramarley Graham Received $25K in Raises, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Dec. 23,
2015),
http://www.democracynow.org/2015/12/23/headlines/nypd_officer_who_
shot_unarmed_ramarley_graham_received_25k_in_raises.
71. There are no national standards for internal affairs units, so each unit may
operate differently. For readers entirely unfamiliar with the internal affairs
review process and how it may work, I recommend two works: U.S. DEP’T OF
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departments across the United States, internal affairs units
review the majority of civilian complaints regarding officer
misconduct.72 Allowing officers within the same police
department to investigate each other presents a variety of
problems throughout the entire complaint process, from
intake to investigation to decision-making and discipline.
Although the reports, surveys, and anecdotes discussed
below are not exhaustive, they provide a taste of the pitfalls
inherent—and existent—in internal review processes around
the country.
A. Police Departments Routinely Deter Citizens from
Reporting Officer Misconduct
The first step in the complaint process is, of course,
making a complaint. Typically, police departments rely on an
internal affairs unit to review those complaints, which means
the citizen reporting the complaint must do so to another
officer within the same police department as the officer about
whom she is complaining. It should come as no surprise that
such complaints are often met with skepticism or, worse,
open hostility. After James Fields, a black man in
Greensboro, North Carolina, filed a complaint alleging that
police officers had falsely arrested him, he reported that a
patrol car parked outside his house every night for a month,
serving as a silent warning about the consequences of making
such claims.73 When Randall Yorker, a father in Manalapan,

JUSTICE, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS: RECOMMENDATIONS
FROM A COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE, http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p164pub.pdf (providing guidelines for what should happen when a civilian files a
complaint with an internal affairs unit); and Ryan J. Reilly, Here’s What Happens
When You Complain to Cops About Cops, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 13, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/internal-affairs-policemisconduct_us_5613ea2fe4b022a4ce5f87ce (discussing what actually does
happen when a citizen tries to file a complaint with an internal affairs unit).
72. MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CITIZEN COMPLAINTS
ABOUT POLICE USE OF FORCE 4 (2006), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
ccpuf.pdf.
73. See Sharon LaFraniere & Andrew W. Lehren, The Disproportionate Risks
of Driving While Black, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/10/25/us/racial-disparity-traffic-stops-driving-black.html?smid=tw-
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New Jersey, went to the police department to report that his
teenage son had been harassed by a police officer, the officer
receiving the complaint called him a “negro,” rolled up the
complaint, and stuffed it into his back pocket. 74 In
Connecticut, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
conducted a survey of Connecticut police departments—
using anonymous volunteers who asked police officers
questions about the complaint-reporting process—and
discovered “widespread resistance to accepting misconduct
complaints.”75 Several police officers refused to answer any
questions about the intake process, others declined to accept
the complaint unless the complainant reported in person to
the police station, and still others said that civilians simply
could not complain about minor issues like an officer’s
discourtesy.76
Even when a police department’s resistance to receiving
complaints does not manifest itself in overt hostility, it can
take more subtle forms, such as imposing unnecessarily
complicated requirements on civilians attempting to file
complaints. The ACLU survey found that the majority of
Connecticut police departments refused to accept anonymous
complaints, third-party complaints, or complaints from
minors unaccompanied by a parent or guardian.77 The
Cleveland Department of Police had even stricter
requirements, refusing to investigate unless the complainant
both identified himself by name and signed the complaint.78
Many police departments also require civilians to swear to
the complaint under penalty of perjury, and threaten
complainants with the possibility of prosecution for false

nytnational&smtyp=cur&_r=0. The police department later rejected every one of
the allegations in Fields’s complaint. Id.
74. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N.J., THE CRISIS INSIDE POLICE INTERNAL
AFFAIRS 5 (2009), https://www.aclu-nj.org/files/3013/1540/4573/060409IA2.pdf.
75. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF CONN., supra note 36, at 1.
76. Id. at 2, 5-6.
77. Id. at 6.
78. CLEVELAND INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at 38-40.
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statements.79 Other departments warn non-citizens that
making a complaint exposes them to the possibility of
deportation.80 All of these practices—preventing people from
making complaints, or warning them about the possibility of
dire consequences if they do—serve to deter people from
making complaints, particularly the minorities and
immigrants who are most likely to be victimized by police
misconduct.
B. Even When People File Complaints, Police Departments
Frequently Fail to Investigate Them
Civilians who endure the intake process and file a
complaint have little assurance that it will ever be
investigated. The DOJ has investigated police departments
across the country for civil rights violations, and found
repeated instances in which civilians’ complaints reported
through an internal intake process were never investigated.
When the DOJ investigated the Ferguson, Missouri Police
Department in the wake of Michael Brown’s death at the
hands of officer Darren Wilson, it found that Ferguson police
officers “rarely respond meaningfully to civilian complaints
of officer misconduct,” and such complaints had a “significant
likelihood” of going uninvestigated.81 The Cleveland
Department of Police, when asked in 2014 to produce final
dispositions for civilian complaints filed within the last two
years, was unable to do so; its files were so disorganized that
it could not even say whether the complaints had been
investigated.82
Other police departments have investigation policies in
place but do not follow them. Until very recently, the Newark,
New Jersey Police Department had a policy that, when it
received a civilian complaint of officer misconduct, the
Internal Affairs Unit was required to investigate the
allegation, document whatever investigative steps it took,
79. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF CONN., supra note 36, at 6, 8; AM. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION OF N.J., supra note 74, at 9.
80. See sources cited supra note 79.
81. FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 33, at 2, 83.
82. CLEVELAND INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at 11.
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and record its ultimate findings.83 In practice, however, the
unit simply did not follow this procedure and many
complaints were not properly investigated.84 A DOJ
investigation into the New Orleans Police Department
revealed even more systemic problems. In addition to being
so disorganized that it could not say whether certain
complaints had ever been investigated, the New Orleans
police failed to track any allegations regarding
discriminatory policing and systematically excluded many
serious misconduct claims from investigation altogether.85
The DOJ is by no means the only agency to uncover
evidence of woefully inadequate, or nonexistent, internal
investigations. In Denver, the Office of the Independent
Monitor found that, between 2011 and 2013, the Denver
Sheriff’s Department’s Internal Affairs Bureau received fiftyfour complaints alleging serious misconduct by deputy
sheriffs and investigated only nine.86 Of the nine
investigations it did conduct, six occurred only after the
Bureau initially ignored the complaints, and the
complainants then filed separate grievances through an
outside agency.87 Had those complainants not persisted after
the Internal Affairs Bureau ignored them, it appears that the
Bureau would not have investigated those six complaints

83. See NEWARK INVESTIGATION, supra note 49, at 37. In January of 2015,
Newark’s mayor announced the creation of a new civilian complaint review board
designated to review many complaints of officer misconduct. See Mark Bonamo,
Newark Mayor Baraka, Police Department Announce Creation of Civilian
Complaint
Review
Board,
POLITICKER
N.J.
(Jan.
20,
2015),
http://politickernj.com/2015/01/newark-mayor-baraka-police-departmentannounce-creation-of-civilian-complaint-review-board/.
84. See NEWARK INVESTIGATION, supra note 49, at 38-39.
85. NEW ORLEANS INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at xvii-xviii, 79-80, 83-84, 88.
86. OIR GROUP, REPORT ON THE USE OF FORCE & INTERNAL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS
THE DENVER SHERIFF DEPARTMENT
47 (2015), http://oirgroup.com/
oirgroup.com/About_files/Report%20on%20the%20Use%20of%20Force%20%26%
20Internal%20Affairs%20Operations%20in%20the%20Denver%20Sheriff%20De
partment,%202015.pdf.
IN

87. DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, 2013 SEMIANNUAL REPORT 12
(2013), https://www.denvergov.org/Portals/374/documents/Semiannual_Report_
Final_2013-12-02.pdf.
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either.88 Even after the Independent Monitor issued this
report, the problem persisted: in 2015, the Independent
Monitor identified another series of complaints that the
Internal Affairs Bureau had received and classified as
needing investigation but had not actually bothered to
investigate.89
Investigative inertia is also not limited to major cities
with overwhelming caseloads. Evidence presented in a
federal lawsuit revealed that the Internal Affairs Unit for the
Camden, New Jersey Police Department had 128 pending
allegations of excessive force by police officers over a one-year
period and investigated only eleven.90 The next year, the
Internal Affairs Unit had a backlog of 174 cases involving
claims of excessive force, and investigated a mere six.91 In
Newark, residents reported filing complaints with the
Internal Affairs Unit and receiving little or no subsequent
contact from investigators.92 When investigators did contact
complainants, they routinely failed to follow up with the
complainants to clarify facts critical to misconduct
investigations.93 Internal affairs investigators in the
Albuquerque Police Department also frequently failed to
interview civilians who had identified themselves as
witnesses to police officers’ use of force.94 A review of the
Santa Maria, California Police Department revealed that the
department had received numerous civilian complaints that
it never looked into at all.95
88. See id.
89. DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, 2015 SEMIANNUAL REPORT 32,
https://www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/374/documents/
OIM_2015_Semiannual_Report_FINAL.pdf.
90. Noble v. City of Camden, 112 F. Supp. 3d 208, 217 (D.N.J. 2015).
91. Id.
92. NEWARK INVESTIGATION, supra note 49, at 38.
93. Id.
94. ALBUQUERQUE INVESTIGATION, supra note 62, at 29 (concluding that the
internal affairs unit was “deficient in carrying out one of its most basic duties”).
95. MICHAEL GENNACO ET AL., OIR GROUP, REPORT TO THE CITY OF SANTA MARIA
SANTA MARIA POLICE DEPARTMENT 17-19 (2014), http://oirgroup.com/
oirgroup.com/Reports_files/santa%20maria%20public%20report%20final.pdf.
ON
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C. When Investigations Do Happen, They Are Heavily
Biased in Favor of the Officers Under Investigation
Internal investigations are notoriously biased in favor of
fellow officers. As Professor Chavis Simmons notes,
“[p]erhaps the strongest criticism of internal police
investigations is that the officers investigating these reports
have an inherent inability to conduct impartial
investigations.”96 This partiality manifests itself in a number
of ways. As one example, internal affairs units often set
impossibly stringent standards for sustaining civilian
complaints. The Cleveland Internal Affairs Unit will sustain
a complaint, and find that the officer violated policy, only if
the allegations are proven beyond a reasonable doubt—the
highest standard in American law, and one virtually never
used for administrative review.97 During DOJ interviews
with Internal Affairs Unit investigators, several officers
admitted that their goal in investigations was to cast the
accused officers in the best light possible.98 The DOJ report
concluded that the Internal Affairs Unit’s “admitted bias
appears deeply rooted” and “cuts at the heart of the
accountability system” within the Cleveland Police
Department.99
The San Jose, California Police Department has a
different method for all but guaranteeing that civilian
complaints will ultimately fail. The San Jose police handle
all allegations of racially-biased policing with a two-step
procedure: (1) asking the accused officer if race was a factor
in his interactions with the complainant; and (2) requiring
the complainant to prove that the officer’s actions were
motivated by race.100 Not surprisingly, the officers regularly
deny that race was a factor in their actions, and the
96. Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder
Collaboration in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 503 (2008).
97. CLEVELAND INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at 5, 35.
98. Id. at 5.
99. Id.
100. CITY OF SAN JOSE, OFFICE OF THE INDEP. POLICE AUDITOR, 2014 IPA YEAR
END REPORT 63, http://www.sanjoseca.gov/DocumentCenter/View/42029.
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complainants are unable to prove that the officers were
motivated by racial bias. As of 2014, the San Jose Police
Department had never once sustained a complaint of
racially-biased policing.101
In other internal affairs units, the standards used to
assess a complaint are essentially irrelevant, because
investigators ignore even the most obvious evidence of officer
misconduct. In Newark, the Internal Affairs Unit sustained
between four and seven percent of civilian complaints in the
years spanning 2010 through 2012.102 Although the unit was
aware that the police department had a serious theft
problem—it had received multiple complaints from arrestees
whose personal property was stolen during the arrest or
booking process, and many of these arrestees had identified
the same officers as responsible for the thefts—the Internal
Affairs Unit did not sustain a single theft complaint against
these officers.103 In a lawsuit filed against the City of Newark,
an expert testified that, after evaluating civilian complaints
and disciplinary records of accused officers, it was clear that
the department had a pattern of “almost invariably
reject[ing]” civilian complaints.104 The expert concluded that
the Newark Police Department paid “little or no attention to
complaints from citizens.”105
After the Connecticut Attorney General’s office reviewed
the Connecticut State Police internal affairs system, it
reported that the review process was “so ineffective,” and the
agency’s predilection to ignore or justify officer misconduct
was “so strong,” that officers were virtually guaranteed to
avoid discipline for even criminal behavior.106 Sometimes this
101. Id. at 9.
102. NEWARK INVESTIGATION, supra note 49, at 35.
103. Id. at 31.
104. Garcia v. City of Newark, No. 08-1725 (SRC), 2011 WL 689616, at *4
(D.N.J. Feb. 16, 2011).
105. Id. at *4.
106. N.Y. STATE POLICE & CONN. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT ON
EVALUATION OF THE CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY INTERNAL
AFFAIRS PROGRAM, at ii, vi, 132 (2006), www.ct.gov/ag/lib/ag/other/conn_report_
12-04-06.pdf.
THE
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bias is the product of high-ranking officers seeking to protect
their own reputation and department. Supervisors within the
Connecticut State Police, for example, directed internal
affairs investigators to ignore evidence, declined to follow up
on investigative leads, and refused to open a case with strong
evidence of misconduct unless the complaint could be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.107 As a result, the internal affairs
unit failed to investigate serious allegations, and officers who
otherwise may have faced disciplinary action as severe as
termination or even arrest retained their jobs without any
consequences.108
D. Investigations Are Particularly Reproachable in the
Context of Excessive Force Complaints
Police officers’ use of excessive force is a frequent source
of discord between police departments and the communities
they serve.109 Use of force is such a significant problem—and
has been for so many years—that even some law enforcement
officials are starting to call for mandatory reporting of all
uses of force by police officers.110 Unfortunately, even when
police officers create those reports, they are typically
reviewed pro forma if at all. When the DOJ investigated the
Ferguson Police Department (FPD), it summarized the
department’s policies for reviewing officers’ use of force as
“particularly ineffectual,” noting that supervisors assigned to
review uses of force “do little to no investigation; either do not
understand or choose not to follow FPD’s use-of-force policy
in analyzing officer conduct; rarely correct officer misconduct
when they find it; and do not see the patterns of abuse that
are evident when viewing these incidents in the aggregate.”111
107. Id. at iii, vi.
108. Id. at iii.
109. See Krogstad, supra note 52 (concluding that minorities are significantly
less likely than whites to express confidence in the ability of the police to treat
races equally and avoid excessive force).
110. See Charles A. Gruber & Wayne W. Schmidt, Mandatory Nationwide Use
of Force Reporting by Police and Correctional Agencies—and Why This is an
Important Issue, 6 AELE MO. L.J. 501, 504-06 (2015).
111. FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 33, at 38.
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Even when the officers’ reports themselves made clear that
they violated the department’s use of force policy—without
even taking into account the civilians’ side of the story—those
officers were virtually never disciplined. Out of 151 incidents
in which officers used force on civilians, supervisors and
command staff approved all but one.112 The Ferguson police
chief himself admitted that he had never once overturned a
supervisor’s conclusion that use of force was reasonable.113
The DOJ report concluded that “uses of force that violate the
law or FPD policy are rarely detected and often ignored when
they are discovered.”114
Police departments across the country rubberstamp their
officers’ overuse of force against civilians. In Albuquerque,
the DOJ found that police department supervisors very
rarely scrutinized their officers’ use of force, and instead
found obviously excessive force to be “reasonable, [or] even
exemplary.”115 In New Orleans, police officers “routinely
disregarded” department policies regarding use of force,
supervisors failed to investigate uses of force, and incidents
involving “clearly unjustified force” were nonetheless
approved by supervisors all the way up the department’s
chain of command.116 Similarly, though the DOJ’s review of
officer-involved shootings within the New Orleans Police
Department revealed “many” instances of “clear policy
violations” over just a two-year period, the police department
itself had not found an officer-involved shooting to violate
policy in the last six years.117 The DOJ investigation
concluded that New Orleans police regularly “used force,
112. Id. at 39.
113. Id. at 41.
114. Id. at 16; see also FERGUSON COMM’N, FORWARD THROUGH FERGUSON: A
PATH
TOWARD
RACIAL
EQUALITY
27
(2015),
http://3680or2khmk
3bzkp33juiea1.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/101415_
FergusonCommissionReport.pdf (noting that civilians’ distrust of Ferguson police
officers was “compounded by the perception that when force is used,
investigations into the use of force incident will be biased toward the law
enforcement officer”).
115. ALBUQUERQUE INVESTIGATION, supra note 62, at 23.
116. NEW ORLEANS INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at vii.
117. Id. at vi, 18.
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including deadly force, in a manner that plainly contradicted
… the Constitution” and endangered the lives of innocent
civilians, but no one in the police department was held
accountable.118
The same is true in Cleveland, where police department
supervisors failed to thoroughly investigate allegations of
excessive force, and instead conducted cursory investigations
that “almost never found the force to be unreasonable,” and
were “designed from the outset to justify officers’ actions.”119
Over a five-year span, the Newark, New Jersey Police
Department did not discipline a single officer for using
excessive force.120 And in Seattle, the police department
received 1,230 use of force reports between 2009 and 2011,
and referred only five for further investigation into the
possibility of officer misconduct.121 An exposé of the review
process there concluded that use of force reviews were little
more than a formality, designed to automatically approve the
officers’ decisions to use force.122
Civilians’ complaints regarding use of force are equally
ignored. Between 2001 and 2007, the Camden, New Jersey
Police Department received 485 complaints regarding
excessive force, and the Internal Affairs Unit sustained only
two.123 The review process was so pointless that a federal
district court concluded a jury could reasonably find the City
of Camden had “a custom of performing inadequate
investigations
of
citizen
complaints
of
police

118. NEW ORLEANS INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at 3. According to the United
States Supreme Court, force is unconstitutionally excessive if it goes beyond what
is “objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances” known to the
officer. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (internal quotations omitted).
119. CLEVELAND INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at 31.
120. NEWARK INVESTIGATION, supra note 49, at 42.
121. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT
4, 12 (2011), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/spd_findletter_1216-11.pdf [hereinafter SEATTLE INVESTIGATION].
122. Id. at 4, 19.
123. Noble v. City of Camden, 112 F. Supp. 3d 208, 217-18 (D.N.J. 2015).
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brutality . . . which reflected an indifference to the allegedly
excessive use of force by its officers.”124
In Albuquerque, the Internal Affairs Unit identified less
than one percent of officers’ use of force incidents as
unreasonable, while the DOJ reviewed the same reports and
concluded that fully one-third of the incidents involved
unreasonable force.125 Even more disturbingly, Albuquerque
police officers shot and killed twenty people between 2009
and 2012, and the DOJ found that the “majority” of those
shootings were unjustified, including multiple cases in which
officers shot and killed civilians who did not pose an
immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury.126 The
DOJ concluded that the Albuquerque Police Department’s
approval of nearly every use of force indicated “a pervasive
and deliberate leniency in supervisory oversight and
accountability.”127
A federal district court reached the same conclusion
regarding the Philadelphia Police Department. The family of
Billy Panas, a man murdered by Philadelphia police officer
Frank Tepper, sued the police department, alleging that it
had intentionally ignored “deeply troubling” use of excessive
force by Officer Tepper.128 The lawsuit alleged that Officer
Tepper had pistol-whipped a citizen, physically attacked
young boys who threw snowballs at his house, and lied about
the incidents to the internal affairs officers.129 Although the
internal affairs investigators made note of Tepper’s volatility
on multiple occasions, and also expressed doubt that he was
telling the truth about the incidents, they recommended no
discipline, and the police department continued to give him
positive reviews.130 The district court held that a jury could
reasonably find that Panas’s death was foreseeable, given
Officer Tepper’s history of excessive force, and that the police
124. Id. at 224.
125. ALBUQUERQUE INVESTIGATION, supra note 62, at 16.
126. Id. at 2-3.
127. Id. at 16; see also id. at 24.
128. Panas v. City of Philadelphia, 871 F. Supp. 2d 370, 372, 379 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
129. Id. at 372-73.
130. Id. at 372-74.
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department could have prevented Panas’s death by
disciplining or firing Tepper.131
The farcical nature of internal police review is perhaps
most tellingly illustrated by police departments that allow
supervisors to “investigate” and approve their own use of
force.132 Both the New Orleans and Albuquerque police
departments, for example, have allowed supervisors who
personally used force against civilians to lead the
investigation into and review complaints regarding their own
use of force.133 Until recently, the Santa Maria Police
Department allowed the same officers who were accused of
using force against arrestees to then interview the arrestees
about those incidents.134 And in multiple officer-involved
shooting investigations in the Albuquerque Police
Department, other officers who were involved in the incident
were allowed to participate in the shooting officer’s interview,
which encourages collaboration in recounting how the
incident occurred.135 This practice—allowing the very people
who have been accused of using force to determine whether
that force was reasonable—brings to mind an old African
proverb: “Corn can’t expect justice from a court composed of
chickens.”136 A civilian complaining about an officer’s
misconduct cannot expect justice to emanate from the very
officer he accused.

131. Id. at 379.
132. See FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 33, at 40.
133. NEW ORLEANS INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at 17-18; ALBUQUERQUE
INVESTIGATION, supra note 62, at 33-34.
134. Michael Gennaco et al., supra note 95, at 7.
135. ALBUQUERQUE INVESTIGATION, supra note 62, at 28.
136. The first person to coin this proverb is unknown, but it is most commonly
used in Nigeria. Roof Garden Wall—Right Center Panel, HARVARD LAW SCH. LIBR.:
WORDS OF JUST., http://library.law.harvard.edu/justicequotes/explore-theroom/south-3 (last visited May 27, 2016). A similar proverb, attributed to an
anonymous Ghanaian, is: “The chicken is never declared innocent in the court of
hawks.” Id.
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E. Internal Affairs Units Routinely Resist Requiring
Serious Discipline for Serious Misconduct
Police departments’ resistance to disciplining their own
officers extends to even the most obvious misconduct. A
report on the Portland, Oregon Police Department found that
the Internal Affairs Division sustained “very few” civilian
complaints of any sort, and filing complaints against
miscreant officers was futile because the department would
simply not discipline them.137 One of the most disturbing
revelations to come out of the Ferguson investigation was
evidence that Ferguson police officers sent numerous racially
discriminatory emails to each other, stereotyping minorities
as lazy, unemployed, living off welfare, and prone to
committing crimes.138 Not one of the officers receiving these
emails ever reported them as inappropriate, and many
forwarded them on to other people.139
The Seattle Police Department has also had a number of
incidents in which police officers used racial slurs against
minorities, including one in which an officer was recorded
threatening to “beat the f’ing Mexican piss out of a suspect.”140
Although multiple officers at the scene witnessed this
incident, none reported it, and the police department did not
discipline the officer until a civilian bystander made public a
video of the incident.141 On other occasions, Seattle police
officers reportedly called a Native American man a “f’ing
Indian,” and derisively suggested that a black man who
worked at a hospital must be “the janitor.”142 Despite
complaints by civilians who overheard the incidents, the
police department declined to discipline these officers.143
137. EILEEN LUNA-FIREBAUGH, PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF THE INDEPENDENT
POLICE REVIEW DIVISION 63 (2008), http://www.portlandonline.com/auditor/index.
cfm?a=245276&c=44653.
138. See FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 33, at 71-72.
139. Id. at 72.
140. SEATTLE INVESTIGATION, supra note 121, at 27.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 28.
143. Id. at 27-28.
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Police departments are also unwilling to refer cases
involving their own officers’ misconduct to the local
prosecutor’s office for potential criminal charges. The DOJ
investigation into the Newark Police Department revealed
“multiple instances in which credible complaints of
potentially criminal uses of force were not referred to
prosecutors for review, even though by any objective measure
they should have been,” and concluded that the department
“often fails” to refer use of force cases to the prosecutor’s
office.144 Similarly, the DOJ report regarding the New
Orleans Police Department concluded that criminal
misconduct by officers was inadequately investigated and too
rarely prosecuted.145 The police department also offered its
investigators no guidance on when or how to contact a
prosecutor when an investigation revealed criminal conduct;
in practice that meant that the investigators declined to
contact the prosecutor at all.146 One possible explanation for
this extreme reluctance to refer officers for prosecution is the
political firestorm that can result: few police chiefs, many of
whom are elected officials, are willing to endure the
groundswell of criticism that results within and outside the
police department’s ranks when the department admits one
of its officers engaged in criminal conduct.147
Nearly twenty years ago in the landmark civil rights
lawsuit Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals lamented the inadequacies of internal review,
mourning that it was:
not enough that an investigative process be in place . . . [t]he
investigative process must be real. It must have some teeth. It must
answer to the citizen by providing at least a rudimentary chance of
144. NEWARK INVESTIGATION, supra note 49, at 25, 28.
145. NEW ORLEANS INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at xvii-xviii.
146. Id. at 94.
147. Compare, The Times Editorial Board, Chief Beck’s Call For Prosecution,
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-lapdshooting-20160111-story.html, with Los Angeles Police Protective League, Why
Chief Beck Failed Us, POLICE MAG. (Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.police
mag.com/blog/patrol-tactics/story/2016/01/why-chief-beck-failed-us.aspx (taking
contrasting viewpoints on LAPD Chief Beck’s decision to recommend criminal
charges in LAPD officer’s shooting of Brendon Glenn, an unarmed black man).
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redress when injustice is done. The mere fact of investigation for
the sake of investigation does not fulfill a city’s obligation to its
citizens.148

Those words ring equally true today. For too many internal
affairs units, the investigative process is nugatory and
toothless. It makes a mockery of the complaint process by
masquerading as a means of redress while perpetuating
injustice.
III. THE FLAWS OF EXISTING INDEPENDENT REVIEW
Independent review agencies are not a new creation: they
first cropped up during the Civil Rights movement of the
1950s and 1960s, after activists, mostly from African
American communities, began demanding that outside
agencies investigate the blatant abuses police officers were
inflicting on black communities.149 The most basic premise of
independent review—also referred to as civilian oversight—
is simply that someone other than a police officer is
responsible for reviewing complaints alleging police
misconduct.150
Independent review agencies exist in many forms.151
Some act as in-house additions to the review process; in this
model, civilian employees serve alongside the internal affairs
unit within a police department. Other independent review
models are strictly external, conducting independent
investigations of police misconduct allegations, and typically
148. Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 974 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Merman
v. City of Camden, 824 F. Supp. 2d 581 (D.N.J. 2010) (detailing citizen complaints
of a pattern of excess force by Camden, New Jersey police officers, and finding a
question of fact over whether the Camden Police Department has a pattern and
practice of allowing such force).
149. Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police
Misconduct: A Model State “Pattern or Practice” Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R.
L.J. 479, 498-99 (2009).
150. See, e.g., Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded
Role for Civilian Review Boards, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 551, 593 (1997).
151. For a more thorough discussion about the varieties of civilian oversight, see
generally, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF CIVILIAN
OVERSIGHT (2001); Samuel Walker, Alternative Models of Citizen Oversight, in
CITIZEN OVERSIGHT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 11 (Justina Cintón Perino ed., 2006).
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recommending discipline if the situation warrants. A third
common form of independent review is the auditor model, in
which designated civilian auditors review the decisions of
internal affairs units after investigations have concluded,
and make recommendations for improvements in future
investigations.152
Although independent review agencies take many forms,
a shared characteristic of nearly all is that they have not done
enough to reduce police misconduct. Even proponents of
independent review agencies admit that they are often
“‘weak, ineffective, poorly led,’ and have had no measurable
impact on police misconduct.”153 The shortcomings of one
prominent independent review agency—New York’s Civilian
Complaint Review Board—were recently highlighted after a
widely-publicized incident in which Officer James Frascatore
of the New York Police Department tackled and handcuffed
tennis star James Blake, a biracial man whom Frascatore
allegedly mistook for an identity theft suspect.154 Blake, who
unlike most victims of police misconduct enjoys sufficient
celebrity to attract media attention to his plight, immediately
took to the press to denounce Officer Frascatore’s unjustified
use of force.155 A subsequent investigation revealed that at
least three other black men had filed complaints against
Officer Frascatore between 2012 and 2013, alleging that he
had assaulted and physically attacked them without
provocation, punched one man repeatedly in the face,
knocked another man to the ground, and used racial slurs in

152. The National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement
Agencies (NACOLE) has an extensive list of and links to civilian oversight
agencies in the United States. See Police Oversight by Jurisdiction (USA), NAT’L
ASS’N FOR CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, http://www.nacole.org/
police_oversight_by_jurisdiction_usa (last visited May 26, 2016).
153. Simmons, supra note 96, at 504 (citation omitted).
154. See Benjamin Mueller & Nate Schweber, Officer Who Arrested James Blake
Has History of Force Complaints, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/09/12/nyregion/video-captures-new-york-officermanhandling-tennis-star-during-arrest.html?smid=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur&
_r=1.
155. Id.
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at least one of the attacks.156 Although all of these complaints
had been reported to the Civilian Complaint Review Board,
they had not resulted in any discipline for Officer
Frascatore.157
New York’s Civilian Complaint Review Board is hardly
the only independent review agency that has been on the
receiving end of extensive, and deserving, criticism. A 2008
review of the Portland Independent Police Review reported
that only twenty to thirty percent of surveyed citizens were
satisfied with the agency, and concluded that the agency
“does not have the confidence of the community.”158 In 2015,
Chicago’s Independent Police Review Authority came under
scathing criticism for hiring a controversial psychologist, best
known for testifying in favor of police officers in shooting
cases, to train its investigators.159 Independent review
agencies struggle from a number of deficiencies in both
staffing and structure, including understaffing, overly cozy
relationships with police departments (or, conversely, poor
cooperation from police departments), insufficient authority,
and unwillingness to take politically unpopular positions.

156. Id.; Associated Press, Officer Who Arrested James Blake Has Two Civil
Rights Suits Against Him, ESPN (Sept. 12, 2015), http://www.espn.com/
espnw/news-commentary/article/13630856/officer-james-blake-arrest-historyexcessive-force-allegations; Daniel Beekman, Queens Man Sues Over Bogus
Arrest That Began with NYPD Cops Pepper-spraying Him Repeatedly—While on
Video, NY DAILY NEWS (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/newyork/queens/queens-man-sues-pepper-spray-abuse-cops-article-1.1755374; Ben
Brumfield, Before Tackling James Blake, Police Officer Had Complaints of
Brutality, CNN (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/14/us/james-blaketackled-officer.
157. Id. The Civilian Complaint Review Board has since sustained a finding
against Officer Frascatore for misconduct in his arrest of Blake, and
recommended discipline of either suspension or termination. See J. David
Goodman, Officer in James Blake Arrest Used Excessive Force, Panel Says, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/08/nyregion/officer-injames-blake-arrest-used-excessive-force-panel-says.html?_r=0.
158. LUNA-FIREBAUGH, supra note 137, at 9.
159. See, e.g., Chip Mitchell, City Sends Police-Shooting Investigators to Trainer
Accused of Pro-Cop Bias, WBEZ NEWS (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.wbez.org/
news/city-sends-police-shooting-investigators-trainer-accused-pro-cop-bias113077.
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A. Many Independent Review Agencies Are Inadequately
Staffed So That Meaningful Investigations Are Virtually
Impossible
Some independent review agencies are staffed entirely by
volunteers, many of whom have very limited review powers.
Baltimore, for example, occasionally convenes an
Independent Review Board in response to specific incidents,
such as a 2011 shooting in which police officers killed an offduty officer and a civilian, and the 2013 death of Tyrone
West, an African American man whom the police were
restraining at the time he died.160 The board relies entirely on
volunteers serving on a part-time basis, and receives no
funding from the city.161 In contrast, the city of Tampa,
Florida has a permanent review board, but it is also staffed
entirely by volunteer members who review only “completed
disciplinary cases” rather than ongoing investigations, and
make only recommendations to the police chief for
improvement in future cases.162 Although the two boards are
structured differently, both struggle to create any real
change: their members are limited in both their opportunity
to investigate in a prompt manner, and their ability to
influence police departments and government officials.
Understaffing often prevents timely responses to
misconduct complaints, even in cities with independent
review agencies run by full-time, paid employees. In New
160. BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT, INDEPENDENT REVIEW BOARD FOLLOW-UP
RESPONSE 1 (2012), http://www.baltimorepolice.org/sites/default/files/IRB_BPD_
Final_v2.pdf [hereinafter FOLLOW-UP RESPONSE]; IN-CUSTODY FATALITY INDEP.
REVIEW BD. FOR THE DEATH OF TYRONE WEST, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12
(2014),
http://www.wbaltv.com/blob/view/-/27381810/data/1/-/wnk60uz//Tyrone-West-death-police-report.pdf [hereinafter DEATH OF TYRONE WEST].
161. DEATH OF TYRONE WEST, supra note 160, at 1-2. Baltimore also has a more
permanent Civilian Review Board tasked with processing and investigating
complaints regarding abusive language, harassment, or excessive force by police
officers. See Civilian Review Board, General Rules, CITY OF BALTIMORE,
http://archive.baltimorecity.gov/Government/BoardsandCommissions/OfficeofCi
vilRightsandWageEnforcement/CivilianReviewBoard/Rules.aspx (last visited
May 26, 2016).
162. Citizens Review Board, CITY OF TAMPA, http://www.tampagov.net/cityclerk/citizens-review-board (last visited May 26, 2016).
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York City, the Citizen Complaint Review Board’s docket is
unmanageably large compared to the number of
investigators; the Review Board has historically taken nearly
a year to resolve the average citizen complaint, and
significantly longer on the rare occasions it sustains a
complaint.163 A startlingly high percentage of independent
review agencies also do not have their own investigators and
are forced to rely on internal affairs officers to handle the
investigations into all alleged misconduct. Scripps News
recently surveyed more than 200 civilian oversight agencies
across the United States, and nearly two-thirds reported that
they do not have their own investigators.164
B. Some Independent Review Agencies Are Inherently
Biased in Favor of the Police
Independent review agencies are often staffed by former
police officers, prosecutors, or members of the law
enforcement community, on the theory that these people
have the greatest expertise in assessing whether a police
officer’s actions were appropriate. Unfortunately, this
composition presents a dilemma similar to that inherent in
internal review: the people reviewing the police often have a
closer relationship with the police department than with the
civilian community they are intended to serve.
This problem is prevalent in many independent review
agencies. As noted above, Chicago’s Independent Police
Review Authority, which is staffed primarily by former law
enforcement officers, recently came under fire for hiring a
psychologist—known primarily for his unwavering defense of
police officers who shoot civilians—to train its
investigators.165 One of the investigators was quoted as
saying that the psychologist’s training gave him “a better
163. NYC CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., ANNUAL REPORT, at ix-x, 1 (2014),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/2014-annual-report-rev2layout.pdf.
164. Ross Jones, Many Civilian Review Groups Have Limited Power to Resolve
Allegations of Police Misconduct, SCRIPPS NEWS (Nov. 16, 2015, 11:14 AM),
http://www.wptv.com/news/national/many-civilian-review-groups-lack-thepower-to-resolve-allegations-of-police-misconduct.
165. Mitchell, supra note 159.
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way to articulate why the [police] shootings are almost
always justified.”166 The former chief of the Independent
Police Review Authority, who resigned in December of 2015
after the Laquan McDonald shooting scandal, also fired one
of the agency’s investigators, an African American man who
had determined that several Chicago police shootings were
unjustified and refused agency pressure to change his
findings.167 As of 2015, the Independent Police Review
Authority had investigated nearly 400 officer-involved
shootings, and found only one to be unjustified.168
Concerns over biased review agencies extend across the
country. Los Angeles terminated its contract with the Office
of Independent Review—a civilian oversight group that
monitored investigations of alleged misconduct in the Los
Angeles Sheriff’s Department—in 2014, amidst allegations
that the review office was too closely partnered with the
Sheriff’s Department, and concerns over the office’s ability to
provide effective oversight.169 The Office of Independent
Review was housed within the Sheriff’s Department and
served in many ways as an advisory counsel to the Sheriff,
rather than an oversight body.170 Similarly, the DOJ
investigation into the Albuquerque Police Department
concluded that, although the City had retained an
independent review officer to investigate allegations of police
misconduct, the review officer was essentially useless
because she aligned herself more closely with the department
than the civilians whose complaints she was hired to
166. Id.
167. Chip Mitchell, City Fires Investigator Who Found Cops at Fault in
Shooting, WBEZ (July 20, 2015), http://www.wbez.org/news/city-firesinvestigator-who-found-cops-fault-shootings-112423.
168. Id.
169. Office of Independent
Review, L.A. CTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T,
http://shq.lasdnews.net/shq/LASD_Oversight/oversight_documents.html
(last
visited May 26, 2016); see also, e.g., Christina Villacorte, Inspector General: End
L.A. County Contracts with Office of Independent Review, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Mar.
18, 2014, 8:05 PM), http://www.dailynews.com/government-and-politics/2014
0318/inspector-general-end-la-county-contracts-with-office-of-independentreview-special-counsel-merrick-bobb.
170. Villacorte, supra note 169.
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investigate.171 The review officer had failed to acknowledge
when departmental policy violations likely occurred,
interpreted the police department’s policies in ways contrary
to the policies’ language, and been “too forgiving of the
department’s use of deadly force.”172
Seattle’s Office of Professional Affairs, which is part of
the Seattle Police Department but has a civilian director, has
also been criticized for frequently deferring to the police
department’s judgment concerning when and how to
investigate allegations of officer misconduct.173 Although the
Office of Professional Affairs is intended to serve as an
impartial investigative body, it for years disposed of most
citizen complaints by sending them to Seattle police precincts
for internal review, even when the complaints involved
serious allegations like excessive force or discriminatory
policing.174 The quality of these investigations was, according
to one Office of Professional Affairs staff member,
“appalling.”175 Similarly, although Cleveland has a civilian
Police Review Board that can be called in to review police
misconduct, the board typically gets involved only after the
internal police investigation has already been completed. 176
The Board relies almost exclusively on the police
department’s findings; although it has subpoena power and
is authorized to compel the police department to disclose
investigative information, it rarely does so.177 As a result of
the Review Board’s lackadaisical approach to investigation,
the DOJ concluded in 2014 that the Review Board played
virtually no meaningful role in investigation.178

171. ALBUQUERQUE INVESTIGATION, supra note 62, at 39.
172. Id.
173. See SEATTLE INVESTIGATION, supra note 121, at 5, 7-8.
174. Id. at 5.
175. Id.
176. CLEVELAND INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at 41-42.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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C. On the Other Extreme, Some Independent Review
Agencies Have Hostile Relationships with the Police and
No Authority to Demand Access to Police Officers or
Files
Although independent review agencies comprised
primarily of former law enforcement officials pose a serious
risk of bias in favor of the police, others suffer from the
opposite problem: police departments that are overtly hostile
and actively stymie the review agencies’ efforts to investigate
misconduct allegations. For example, although the
Philadelphia Police Advisory Commission exists to provide
independent civilian oversight of police operations, the
Philadelphia Police Department often refuses to disclose
investigative files or complaints, and the Commission cannot
access information critical to its investigations.179 In
Washington, D.C., the Office of Police Complaints—the
civilian oversight agency tasked with investigating police
misconduct—reported that more than one-third of the police
officers it investigated refused to cooperate with
investigators, and the review agency could not require them
to do so.180
Hostility from the police could be overcome if the review
agency was able to demand access to necessary police files or
witnesses, but that is often not the case. Many independent
review agencies lack even subpoena power, and cannot
require police departments to provide information necessary
to review claims.181 Additionally, about one-half of states
179. GEORGE FACHNER & STEVEN CARTER, COLLABORATIVE REFORM INITIATIVE:
AN ASSESSMENT OF DEADLY FORCE IN THE PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT 119
(2015), http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0753-pub.pdf.
180. GOV’T OF D.C., POLICE COMPLAINTS BD., OFFICE OF POLICE COMPLAINTS:
ANNUAL
REPORT
24-25
(2012),
https://assets.document
cloud.org/documents/608268/office-of-police-complaints-annual-report.pdf;
see
also Peter Hermann, D.C. Civilian Police Oversight Board Concerned As Lanier
Overrules Decisions, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/local/dc-civilian-police-oversight-board-concerned-as-lanier-overrulesdecisions/2013/02/27/34e55944-800c-11e2-8074-b26a871b165a_story.html.
181. DEATH OF TYRONE WEST, supra note 160, at 1; FOLLOW-UP RESPONSE, supra
note 160, at 1; David Porter, Newark OKs Strong Police Review Board; Union
Vows
Fight,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Mar.
16,
2016,
8:43
PM),
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across the United States, as well as many cities, have laws
that heavily favor police officers against those seeking
information about the officers, and prevent disclosure of
disciplinary records or complaints filed against those officers
except in rare circumstances.182 Although some review
agencies are specifically exempted from these privacy laws,
others are forced to rely only on what sparse records the
police departments consent to disclose.
Other review agencies may not even know what
complaints are being reported, because the review agency
itself is not the designated recipient of all civilian complaints.
In Seattle, for example, the Office of Professional Authority
tracks complaints that civilians make directly to its office,
but has no ability to track complaints made to individual
police officers, police precincts, or the City itself. The Seattle
Police Department has for years routinely failed to refer
civilian complaints to the Office of Professional Authority,
which results in a civilian oversight agency unable to
investigate even serious complaints like excessive force. 183
And over a two-year period from 2011 to 2013, the Denver
Sheriff’s Department notified the Office of the Independent
Monitor about only nineteen percent of serious grievances
that inmates filed.184 Where the Independent Monitor was not
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/a4867d7361a24653ab5a3bc13e727d2a/newark-okstrong-police-review-board-union-vows-fight.
182. For a few examples of these laws, see, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §50-A
(McKinney 2016) (preventing disclosure of police records except by court order);
AURORA, COLO., MUN. CODE § 50-41 (placing strict limitations on disclosure of
police records even when deemed relevant to criminal proceedings); Copley Press,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 141 P.3d 288 (Cal. 2006) (holding that police personnel
records are confidential under state law); Md. Dep’t of State Police v. Dashiell,
117 A.3d 1 (Md. 2015) (holding that internal affairs investigatory records are
exempt from disclosure); see also Jonathan Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot:
Impeachment Evidence in Police Personnel Files and the Battle Splitting the
Prosecution Team, 67 STAN. L. REV. 743 (2015) (discussing how various state and
city laws hamper disclosure of police personnel records in criminal cases); David
Packman, Police Misconduct Disclosure Laws, CATO INSTITUTE (Feb. 7, 2010),
http://www.policemisconduct.net/police-misconduct-disclosure-laws/ (providing
summary of police misconduct disclosure laws in all fifty states).
183. SEATTLE INVESTIGATION, supra note 121, at app. D2.
184. DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, supra, note 87 at 19.
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even told about eighty-one percent of the most serious
grievances, it had no way of investigating those complaints.
D. A Large Percentage of Complaints That Independent
Review Agencies Receive Are Never Meaningfully
Resolved
A startlingly low percentage of complaints made to
independent review agencies are ever resolved with a finding
that the alleged misconduct did or did not occur. The problem
arises in part because of the unnecessary obstacles imposed
on civilians attempting to report misconduct, which result in
a high percentage of complaints being turned away at the
proverbial (or actual) door. Albuquerque’s Police Review
Commission, for example, is required by ordinance to reject
a complaint unless it is personally signed by the complainant,
nor can it accept a complaint that is reported more than
ninety days after the alleged misconduct.185 As a result, a
large number of complaints are rejected without even a
cursory investigation. In Chicago, the Independent Police
Review Authority requires a signed, sworn affidavit from
almost every complainant, and will not move forward with
the investigation unless it receives that affidavit.186 In 2012,
the Independent Police Review Authority and the Chicago
Police Department’s Board of Internal Affairs collectively
closed more than forty percent of all complaints simply
because they did not obtain the requisite affidavit.187
When agencies do investigate complaints, the
investigations still may not result in any meaningful
185. ALBUQUERQUE INVESTIGATION, supra note 62, at 38-39.
186. RON SAFER ET AL., PREVENTING AND DISCIPLINING POLICE MISCONDUCT: AN
INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING CHICAGO’S POLICE
DISCIPLINARY
SYSTEM
13
n.3,
(2014),
http://www.cityofchicago.org/
content/dam/city/progs/safety/Preventing_Disciplining_Police_Misconduct_Dec_
2014.pdf; File a Complaint, INDEP. POLICE REVIEW AUTHORITY, http://iprachicago.
org/howtofile.html (last visited May 26, 2016) (“State law requires that any person
making an allegation of misconduct against a Chicago police officer sign a sworn
affidavit that certifies that the allegation is true and correct.”).
187. SAFER ET AL., supra note 186, at 48; see also GORDON WALDRON, PROCESSING
COMPLAINTS AGAINST CHICAGO POLICE OFFICERS 4 tbl.3 (2015) (source on file with
the author).
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resolution. In 2014, New York City’s Citizen Complaint
Review Board closed out nearly one-half of its cases with a
finding of “unsubstantiated,” which means that the Board did
not determine whether the complaint had merit or not.188 In
the same year, Chicago’s Independent Police Review
Authority closed out fifty-four percent of its investigations as
“not sustained,” meaning that the agency decided it did not
have sufficient evidence to determine whether the complaint
was true or false.189 Between 2008 and 2012, the agency
closed out seventy-one percent of its cases with a “not
sustained” finding.190 Because most agencies are not required
to report the reasons behind their findings, it is impossible to
say exactly why these numbers are so high. But when a
complaint is not sustained, no one is vindicated: not the
officer accused, not the civilian who filed the complaint, and
not the community hoping for a reason to believe that the
review process actually works.
Yet another factor contributing to extreme delays in
resolving—or simply inability to resolve—citizen complaints
is that the independent review agency is sometimes just one
of several agencies involved in the review process. In
Chicago, the Independent Police Review Authority processes
the initial intake of all complaints, but depending on the type
of misconduct alleged, it is just one of three agencies that may
be involved in the review process.191 Misconduct
investigations often drag on for years, and if the Review
Authority eventually does recommend discipline, it takes
even longer to implement because of the myriad of grievance
and appeals opportunities available to the officers. 192 Such
extreme delays in resolving complaints may cause citizens to
188. N.Y.C. CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., ANNUAL REPORT 27 (2014),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/2014-annual-report-rev2layout.pdf.
189. WALDRON, supra note 187, at 5, tbl. 5.
190. Id. at 10. As low as these numbers may seem, they are a significant
improvement over the absolutely abysmal rate of sustained investigations before
the Independent Police Review Authority was established. For a statistical
analysis of these stunningly low rates, see Craig B. Futterman et al., The Use of
Statistical Evidence to Address Police Supervisory and Disciplinary Practices: The
Chicago Police Department’s Broken System, 1 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 251, 267
tbl.1 (2008).
191. See SAFER ET AL., supra note 186, at 1.
192. Id. at 7.
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believe that the agency is ineffectual, or worse, simply
ignoring their complaints.
E. Independent Review Agencies Almost Universally Lack
Authority to Impose Discipline
Perhaps the most common complaint about independent
review agencies is that they lack the authority to create
meaningful change. Sometimes this stems from the agency’s
inability to investigate certain types of claims: for example,
despite complaints that New York Police Department officers
have a long history of making false statements in police
reports or to investigative bodies, the Citizen Complaint
Review Board is not authorized to investigate false statement
cases; complaints about false statements are automatically
referred to the Internal Affairs Unit.193
More typically, however, the problem is that independent
review agencies are—with very few exceptions—not
authorized to require or impose discipline. Some agencies,
like the Cleveland Police Review Board, play no role
whatsoever in the disciplinary process.194 But most simply
have the ability to recommend discipline, which the police
chief is then free to accept or reject. The setup in St. Louis
County, Missouri, is typical of this approach; there, a civilian
Board of Police Commissioners reviews certain types of
misconduct allegations and makes recommendations on
discipline, but the chief of police remains the final authority
on whether to impose that discipline.195 New York City’s
Civilian Complaint Review Board also does not have any
disciplinary authority; instead, it simply forwards its
findings to the police commissioner, who frequently
193. N.Y.C. CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., supra note 188, at x-xi, 39-45.
194. CLEVELAND INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at 41.
195. BLAKE NORTON ET AL., COLLABORATIVE REFORM INITIATIVE: AN ASSESSMENT
ST. LOUIS COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT 98 (2015), http://ric-zaiinc.com/Publications/cops-p316-pub.pdf. Another example of this approach is the
Albuquerque civilian oversight structure, where the Police Oversight Commission
makes recommendations on both misconduct findings and discipline, but the
police chief retains complete discretion over the ultimate decision of whether
misconduct occurred and, if so, what discipline is appropriate. See ALBUQUERQUE
INVESTIGATION, supra note 62, at 38.
OF THE
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disregards the Review Board’s recommendations.196 As of
2014, the Civilian Complaint Review Board reported that the
Police Department had declined to impose any discipline in
fully one-quarter of cases in which the Review Board found
misconduct and recommended discipline.197
Chicago’s Independent Police Review Authority in theory
has more power to enforce discipline, but in practice serves
mostly as an example of bureaucracy getting in the way of
real change. When the Independent Police Review Authority
sustains a finding of misconduct against a police officer, it
recommends discipline to the superintendent of police.198 The
recommended discipline goes through an extensive review
process within the police department, during which
supervisors in the accused officer’s chain of command have
an opportunity to concur or disagree with the recommended
discipline before the case is passed on to the
superintendent.199 The superintendent then has ninety days
to respond.200 If the superintendent disagrees with the
Review Authority’s recommendation, the case is referred to a
separate three-person Police Board, which reviews the case
and decides whether the superintendent is justified in
departing from the Review Authority’s recommendation.201
Even the Police Board’s decision is not final and can be
overridden if the officer chooses to appeal.202 In 2012, the
average complaint filed with the Review Authority took
nearly three years to reach a final disposition because so

196. See N.Y.C. CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., supra note 188, at 6; N.Y.C.
Civilian Complaint Review Bd., About CCRB, CITY OF NEW YORK,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/html/about/about.shtml (last visited May 26, 2016);
N.Y.C. Civilian Complaint Review Bd., APU and Police Discipline, CITY OF NEW
YORK, http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/html/police/police.shtml (last visited May 26,
2016).
197. N.Y.C. CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., supra note 188, at 6.
198. SAFER ET AL., supra note 186, at 14.
199. Id. See also WALDRON, supra note 187, at 8.
200. SAFER ET AL., supra note 186, at 14.
201. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 2-57-60 (2007); SAFER ET AL., supra note 186, at
14; WALDRON, supra note 187, at 8.
202. SAFER ET AL., supra note 186, at 15.
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many agencies are involved in the review process and officers
have so many options for appeal.203
F. When Independent Review Agencies Do Recommend
Discipline, It Is Typically Very Minor
Even on the relatively rare occasions that an
independent review agency sustains a misconduct complaint
and recommends discipline, the discipline is often so
negligible that it stands little chance of operating as an
impetus for change. When Chicago’s Independent Review
Authority recently found that numerous police officers had
racially discriminated against civilians—by using words the
agency euphemistically described as “racially biased
language,” “racial comments,” “racially offensive comments,”
and “ethnically biased language”—the Review Authority
recommended minor suspensions of no more than a few days
for each officer.204 It is difficult to envision another
professional setting in which an employee would be allowed
to use racial slurs against a customer and even retain his
job,205 let alone escape with a brief suspension and no other
discipline. Yet in policing, a profession which already
shoulders the shame of decades of discrimination against

203. Id. at 15-16.
204. See CITY OF CHI. INDEP. POLICE REVIEW AUTH., QUARTERLY REPORT APRIL 1,
2015–JUNE 30, 2015, at Abstracts of Sustained Cases C.R. Nos. 1052025, 1050270,
1060197, 1068340, 1066452, http://www.iprachicago.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/07/2015-07-15QuarterlyReport.pdf. The report does not provide any specific
descriptions of the racially offensive language that the officers used. Id.
205. See, e.g., Eric B. Meyer, Intern Fired for Racist Tweet, EMPLOYER
HANDBOOK (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.theemployerhandbook.com/2015/10/
intern-fired-for-using-racial-slur-on-twitter-keeps-digging-the-hole-deeper.html;
Oregon Man Fired After Yelling Hispanic Slurs . . . at Arab Woman, RT QUESTION
MORE (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.rt.com/usa/328327-oregon-man-racial-slursvideo (describing the story of a plumber in Oregon who was fired after yelling
racial slurs at an Arab woman); Khushbu Shah, Wendy’s Employees Fired for
Leaving Racist Note in 7-Year-Old’s Meal, EATER (Oct. 16, 2015),
http://www.eater.com/2015/10/16/9552435/two-wendys-employees-fired-racistnote-kids-meal-colorado (describing how a Wendy’s employee was fired for using
a racial slur with a customer).

882

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

racial minorities,206 the response to openly biased officers is
still little more than a gentle chiding.
Vague suggestions about possible discipline are as
ineffectual as inadequate discipline. In 2013, Denver’s Office
of the Independent Monitor issued a report finding that, over
the past two years, almost one in six complaints that inmates
had filed against the Denver Sheriff’s Department involved
just four deputies, from a staff of over 700 officers.207 In the
face of this startling statistic, the Independent Monitor made
only one recommendation: that “these officers, or the jail
areas to which they are assigned, may require more active
supervision by jail administrators.”208 When less than 0.6
percent of the department’s officers are responsible for more
than 15 percent of misconduct complaints, that should
trigger a response more forceful than a recommendation for
“more active supervision.”209 Independent review agencies
serve little purpose if they do not have the courage or
authority
to
make
more
than
mealy-mouthed
recommendations in response to major problems.
IV. THE FIX: ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE REVIEW AGENCY
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights released a report on the status
of police reform in the United States, commenting that
complaints of police misconduct “seem to be incessant, and
they typically prompt a complex series of responses:
community leaders cry out for change; law enforcement
agencies assert that they are doing their job; federal
investigators evaluate rogue police officers and entire
departments; politicians debate about policies that purport
to be tough on crime, yet strong on civil rights.”210 The report
concluded that, in the face of seemingly endless outcry over
abusive police tactics, the nation desperately needed a
206. See supra Part I.
207. DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, supra note 87, at 3.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, Executive Summary, supra note 54.
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“reasoned, systematic approach to honestly and sufficiently
address police misconduct, once and for all.”211
Fifteen years later, the United States has yet to solve the
police misconduct crisis. Politicians continue to debate
policing policies, the federal government continues to
investigate police departments, and community leaders
continue to cry out for change.212 Cities across the country are
dealing with civilian populations increasingly disenchanted
with and disenfranchised from their local police
departments.
The failures of existing review systems have much to do
with this growing disgust.213 As the DOJ reported after its
investigation of the Albuquerque Police Department, “failure
to take meaningful remedial action . . . promotes a culture of
unjustifiable aggression that further alienates the
department from the communities it serves.”214 This
alienation is not the fault of just a few rogue officers engaging
in misconduct, although certainly they are part of the
problem. The institutional culture within police
departments, which has been so willing for so long to tolerate
misconduct, must change.215
The remainder of this Article is an effort to move cities
toward creating the meaningful institutional change that is
so desperately needed, by identifying the core components,
staff, and structure of an effective independent review
agency.

211. Id.
212. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 21.
213. See, e.g., SEATTLE INVESTIGATION, supra note 121, at 21.
214. ALBUQUERQUE INVESTIGATION, supra note 62, at 4; see also NEW ORLEANS
INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at xviii (concluding that as a result of inadequate
investigations and responses to officer misconduct, police departments have little
legitimacy in the communities they are intended to serve).
215. Simmons, supra note 35, at 366.
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A. Independent Review Agencies Should Be Staffed By
Full-time, Paid Employees
I begin with my simplest point, but one that many cities
have refused to recognize: independent review agencies must
be adequately staffed by paid employees rather than
volunteers. As Part III discusses above,216 one significant
roadblock to successful independent review is relying on
volunteers that have neither the time nor the resources (nor,
in many cases, the credibility and authority) to review
misconduct complaints in a timely manner, let alone
implement lasting reforms.217 If cities are serious about
changing the culture of their police departments, and
responding effectively to civilian complaints, they will
sufficiently staff and fund independent review agencies.
B. To Protect Against Bias, Independent Review Agencies
Should Be Staffed by a Diverse Array of Civilians and
Law Enforcement Officials
Trusting police officers to police themselves does not
work.218 Any effective review agency must be staffed
primarily by independent actors—individuals who are not
employed by the police department or connected to it in any
way. Using an external oversight model is the first step
toward building community trust, by giving civilians a
meaningful voice into how the police department operates
and what measures can be taken to improve it. It also allows
outsiders to identify deficiencies in existing police practices,
and promotes transparency in resolving complaints about
officer misconduct.219
Cities must look beyond the law enforcement community
to staff these agencies. Many independent review agencies
are staffed primarily or exclusively by former law
216. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
217. See SAFER ET AL., supra note 186, at 7, 40; see also CLEVELAND
INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at 37 (noting that it can take up to two years to
complete the review process for an officer found to have committed misconduct).
218. See supra Part II.
219. ALBUQUERQUE INVESTIGATION, supra note 62, at 37-38.
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enforcement officials and prosecutors.220 A better model is one
that incorporates input from members of the public who have
no ties to the police department, including those who have
been specifically critical of the police. Adding civilian voices
to the review process forces authorities to confront the
perspectives of the people most affected by police misconduct.
It also adds legitimacy to the reform effort—when the public
participates, it is more likely to support that effort and invest
in its success.221 This very issue is playing out in Los Angeles,
which has a five-member Board of Police Commissioners who
serve as an oversight agency for the Los Angeles Police
Department.222 Although the board members are civilians,
many view them merely as well-connected political donors,
rather than people concerned about or affected by police
misconduct.223 In the fall of 2015, protesters began gathering
at and disrupting the weekly Police Commission meetings,
demanding that a minority activist be given a spot on the
Police Commission.224 Without any voice on the Commission,
many minorities question its impartiality and doubt its
commitment to reform.225
Precisely how citizens are selected to serve on an
independent review agency may vary somewhat from city to
city, but two examples that serve as a useful model are
Cincinnati’s Citizen Complaint Authority and Newark, New
Jersey’s Civilian Complaint Review Board. The Cincinnati
Citizen Complaint Authority was formed in response to a
class-action lawsuit by Cincinnati citizens against the City of
Cincinnati and the Cincinnati Police Department, alleging
widespread misconduct and racially-biased policing.226 In the
220. See supra Part III.B.
221. See Simmons, supra note 96, at 538-39; Simmons, supra note 53, at 40910.
222. The Function and Role of the Board of Police Commissioners, LAPD,
http://www.lapdonline.org/police_commission/content_basic_view/900
(last
visited May 28, 2016).
223. See Times Editorial Bd., supra note 67.
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. Collaborative Agreement at 2, In re Cincinnati Policing, 209 F.R.D. 395
(S.D. Ohio 2002) (No. C-1-99-317).
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six years leading up to the lawsuit, Cincinnati police had
killed fifteen black men, and the last death—the shooting of
Timothy Thomas at the hands of a police officer—ignited four
days of rioting.227
The parties to the lawsuit eventually reached a
settlement known as the Cincinnati Collaborative
Agreement.228 The settlement specified that the city must
create the Citizen Complaint Authority, a civilian oversight
agency with the mission to “investigate serious interventions
by police officers, including but not limited to shots fired,
deaths in custody and major uses of force, and to review and
resolve all citizen complaints in a fair and efficient
manner.”229 Before staffing the Citizen Complaint Authority,
the City identified and reached out to eight different
“stakeholder” groups: “African-Americans, social service and
religious organizations, businesses and philanthropic groups,
police line officers and spouses, white citizens, other
minorities and youth.”230 The City also made online
questionnaires available to all residents, as well as interview
opportunities for residents who lacked computer access.231
The parties to the settlement reported that over 3500 people
were consulted during the process of creating the Citizen
Complaint Authority.232
Ultimately, the City decided to staff the Citizen
Complaint Authority with three categories of employees: (1)
a board of seven citizens appointed by the mayor and
approved by the city council; (2) an Executive Director and
support staff, appointed by the City Manager in consultation
with the Review Board; and (3) a team of professional

227. William Freivogel, Could Police Reform in Cincinnati Provide Model for
Ferguson?, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Oct. 19, 2014), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/
post/could-police-reform-cincinnati-provide-model-ferguson.
228. Collaborative Agreement at 1, In re Cincinnati Policing, 209 F.R.D. 395
(S.D. Ohio 2002) (No. C-1-99-317).
229. Id. at 18.
230. Id. at 2.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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investigators.233 The settlement agreement required the
board to be comprised of a “diverse array of seven individuals,
from a cross-section of the Cincinnati community, who have
the requisite education and experience to impartially review
evidence and render judgments on alleged officer
misconduct.”234 It also specified that, to staff the board, the
mayor would accept nominations from fifty-two different
community councils within the city, as well as businesses,
civic and social service agencies, and other organizations.235
Cincinnati residents who are not nominated through any of
these organizations can apply individually.236 To alleviate the
concern that civilians without law enforcement experience
might not have the requisite training or knowledge to
effectively resolve police misconduct complaints, each
member of the board is required, before taking office, to
complete a basic training course that includes classes at the
Cincinnati Police Academy, instruction in constitutional and
criminal protections, and ride-alongs with members of the
Cincinnati Police Department.237
The Citizen Complaint Authority was formed in 2002 and
remains in effect today.238 As of 2014, its board and staff
members included a retired police sergeant who had
previously worked with lawyers investigating lawsuits
against the Detroit Police Department, a former probation
officer, a youth employment coordinator for the Cincinnati
Urban League, a customer service professional, and a graphic
designer.239 More than ten years after it was founded, deadly
shootings are down and use of force incidents by police
officers have dramatically decreased, leading some to suggest

233. Id. at 18, 20.
234. Id. at 18.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 19.
238. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUN. CODE art. 27, § 1 (2002).
239. CITY OF CINCINNATI CITIZEN COMPLAINT AUTH., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 9-10,
http://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/ccia/citizen-complaint-authority/citizen-complaintannual-reports/2014-annual-report.
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that the Citizen Complaint Authority has played a
significant role in reducing police misconduct240
Newark, New Jersey’s recently-formed Civilian
Complaint Review Board also stresses the importance of
diverse civilian viewpoints informing the review of police
misconduct claims. The Review Board is composed of nine
members, one of whom is selected by the city’s inspector
general, three of whom are appointed by the municipal
council, and five of whom are voted in by specified local and
civil rights organizations, including the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People and the ACLU.241 No
more than one member may be a former employee of the
Newark Police Department.242
The recently-established Ferguson Commission offers
another illustration for cities aiming to incorporate civilian
viewpoints into their review agencies. Although the Ferguson
Commission’s responsibilities extend far beyond law
enforcement—it is tasked with assessing and addressing a
wide array of governmental failures, from school systems to
municipal courts—it has a working group specifically devoted
to improving law enforcement-citizen relationships.243 This
group tackles topics such as police use of force, anti-bias and
cultural competency training, accountability for police
misconduct, community policing, civilian oversight of police
departments, and special prosecutions for officers accused of
criminal misconduct.244
To staff the working group, the Commission intentionally
recruited “voices and philosophies of practice that were in
tension with one another,” and selected members in part
240. See Freivogel, supra note 227.
241. Newark, N.J. Exec. Order (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.ci.newark.nj.us/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/ExecutiveOrder-CivilianComplaintReview
BoardwithRules_FINAL.pdf (establishing the Civilian Complaint Review Board);
see Daniel Ross, Newark’s New Disciplinary Board Could Flex Rare Muscle over
Police, YES! MAG. (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.yesmagazine.org/peacejustice/newarks-new-civilian-board-could-wield-rare-disciplinary-muscle-overpolice-20150911.
242. Newark, N.J. Exec. Order, supra note 241.
243. FERGUSON COMM’N, supra note 114, at 13-14.
244. Id. at 15.
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based on the Commission’s commitment to including “diverse
voices” in the reform process.245 The Commission concluded
that civilians with no law enforcement experience were
crucial to the review process “not because they are experts in
policing, but precisely because they are not experts. Their
insight into the day-to-day lives of average citizens is the
perspective that law enforcement agencies need to effectively
protect and serve the community.”246
Having emphasized the importance of staffing review
agencies with a diverse array of civilians representing varied
interests and viewpoints, I acknowledge that a limited
number of positions in review agencies—specifically, those
requiring in-the-field investigative work—may be more
fitting for people with law enforcement experience, simply
because many people with training and experience as
investigators have law enforcement backgrounds. But these
investigators need not—and ought not—be part of the police
department that the review agency oversees. Some states
have incorporated similar principles into law: in Wisconsin,
for example, all officer-involved shooting investigations are
led by “at least two investigators . . . neither of whom is
employed by a law enforcement agency that employs a law
enforcement officer involved in” the shooting under
investigation.247 In the case of a review agency, the
investigators should be vetted to ensure they have never been
employed by, and do not have ties with, the police
department they are investigating.
The most effective review agency may also include a
designated representative from the police department under
review, although that representative should participate only
in an advisory capacity and have no role in investigations. I
say this for two reasons. First, very few independent review
agencies are authorized to require discipline for officers who
have committed misconduct, with the usual explanation
being that civilians are not sufficiently well-versed in
policing procedures to understand when misconduct occurs
and what type of discipline is appropriate. Having a
245. Id.
246. Id. at 30.
247. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, 2015 INTERIM REPORT
21, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/interim_tf_report.pdf.
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representative from the police department participate in an
advisory role could inform the disciplinary recommendations,
give the review agency more credibility in determining what
discipline should be imposed, and lend leverage to the
argument that the review agency should have power to
require specific discipline. Second, any lasting effort to curb
abusive conduct must transform the policing culture that
permits—and in many cases fosters—the “us-versus-them”
mentality so prevalent among police officers and the
communities they are intended to serve.248 Giving civilians
and police officers an opportunity to hear and work with each
other could serve as a significant step toward changing that
mentality.
Seattle’s Citizen Police Commission, formed in 2012, is a
rare example of an agency that intentionally incorporates the
viewpoints of both law enforcement officials and civilians.
The Citizen Police Commission was developed as part of a
settlement agreement between the City of Seattle and the
DOJ, after the DOJ found a pattern and practice of
unconstitutional conduct by Seattle police officers.249 The
Citizen Police Commission consists of fifteen members,
appointed by the mayor and confirmed by city council. Two
are required to be police officers: one representative from the
Seattle Police Officers Guild, and another from the Seattle
Police Management Association. The remaining thirteen
Commission members are civilians from a wide array of
backgrounds.250 The mayor’s office accepts applications online
from any interested Seattle resident, and the Commission’s
stated goal is to “represent[] . . . Seattle’s diverse population
by selecting equally qualified members from . . . minority,
ethnic, and faith communities, student . . . organizations,
and any other community organizations.”251
248. See, e.g., L. Song Richardson, Police Racial Violence: Lessons from Social
Psychology, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 2961, 2972 (2015).
249. Settlement Agreement at 4, United States v. City of Seattle, No. 12-CV1282 (W.D. Wash), http://www.seattle.gov/archive/mcginn/media/pdf/120727
settlementagreement.pdf.
250. SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 124201, at 4 (October 29, 2012), http://www.
seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/CommunityPoliceCommission/CPC%20Ord
inance%20124021.pdf.
251. Id. at 4-5.
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In an attempt to ensure the Commission is staffed by a
diverse group of civilians, the City developed a list of specific
criteria the mayor must consider when selecting
commissioners. Seattle’s criteria include: demonstrated
experience working effectively with diverse populations;
demonstrated experience working collaboratively to create
positive change in organizations; experience with different
aspects of the justice system (whether as prosecutor, defense
attorney, defendant, victim, or another unspecified role);
experience with race and social justice work, crimes against
women, or public and mental health issues; experience with
harm reduction models; knowledge of police policies and
procedures; understanding of local government and city
departments; understanding of labor policy and negotiations;
demonstrated community leadership; and independent
judgment.252 People with prior criminal convictions, who have
demonstrated successful rehabilitation, are strongly
encouraged to apply.253 In 2015, the commissioners included
the acting captain of the Seattle Police Department, a police
officer, two reverends, the deputy director of the Washington
ACLU, the program coordinator for an organization called
Youth Undoing Institutional Racism, a juvenile justice policy
advocate, the founder of the Seattle Neighborhood Group, a
youth worker, a behavioral health specialist, and a highranking public defender.254 Six are women, and eight are
men.255 Slightly less than one-half of the commissioners are
members of a racial or ethnic minority.256
In explaining why it chose to create a Commission that
incorporates the viewpoints of both law enforcement officials
and civilians—including many leaders of organizations
traditionally at odds with police departments—the City of
Seattle emphasized its belief that reform is “best developed

252. Id. at attachment 1.
253. Id.
254. Seattle Community Police Commission, About Us, http://www.seattle.gov/
community-police-commission/about-us (last visited May 28, 2016).
255. Id.
256. Id.
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by dialogue and wide-spread input.”257 Both community
members and police officers brought “an important voice to
the reform process” that could inform both the development
and implementation of new policies and procedures.258 The
Citizen Police Commission has already had some notable
successes. Not long after it was founded, the Commission
members demanded a voice in developing a new use-of-force
policy for the police department and argued that Seattle
police officers must be trained in de-escalation techniques,
which community groups had long demanded but the police
department had never been willing to implement.259 Although
the police department initially pushed back, the end result
was a new policy on use of force that included a significant
de-escalation component.260 One of the notable aspects of this
triumph was that the Commission, including the Seattle
police union representatives as well as traditionallyantagonistic groups such as the ACLU, presented a united
front in demanding de-escalation training.261 Although data
on the police department’s use of force since de-escalation
training began is still very preliminary, a report released by
the police department, detailing uses of force between May
and August of 2015, showed that officers used force in less
than two percent of interactions with people in crisis, which
the DOJ hailed as significant progress since the 2012 finding

257. Settlement Agreement, supra note 249, at 2-3.
258. Id. at 2.
259. Samuel Walker, How Seattle Bridged the Community-Police Divide, CRIME
REP. (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.thecrimereport.org/viewpoints/2015-08-howseattle-bridged-the-community-police-divide.
260. Id.; see Kathleen O’Toole, Seattle Police Department Manual: 8.100-Deescalation, CITY OF SEATTLE (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.seattle.gov/policemanual/title-8---use-of-force/8100---de-escalation (revised police department
policy regarding use of force and de-escalation); Timothy Williams, Long Taught
to Use Force, Police Warily Learn to De-escalate, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/us/long-taught-to-use-force-police-warilylearn-to-de-escalate.html?_r=0.
261. Walker, supra note 259.
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that the police department had a pattern and practice of
using excessive force.262
My last suggestion for staffing an independent review
agency is that, in addition to full-time, paid staff, cities
should allow young adults—high school or college students—
to apply for volunteer positions on the board. Young adults
are one of the demographics most likely to suffer the effects
of police misconduct, and in many cases are also the most
likely to have a poor opinion of the police. Their voices should
be heard in the reform process. A recent report suggesting
reforms for the St. Louis County, Missouri Police Department
made a similar proposal, recommending that the police
department “create a board of young adult police
commissioners made up of juniors and seniors from several
city high schools,” whose mission would be to “bridge the gap
between young adults and [St. Louis County] officers.”263
Rather than creating a separate board of young adults,
teenagers and young adults should be allowed to apply for
volunteer positions in the review agency, adding their voice
and lending fresh perspective to the problems that can arise
from police misconduct.
C. Independent Review Agencies Should Be Responsible for
Intake of All Civilian Complaints
Meaningful accountability for police misconduct begins
at the intake stage of a complaint. When civilians who have
been victims of police misconduct try to file complaints,
requiring them to report the misconduct to other officers in
the same police department often has, as explained in Part
II, the effect of deterring civilians from filing the complaint
at all. If an individual is afraid to make a complaint or
otherwise deterred from doing so, the misconduct will never
be reported, let alone investigated or resolved. And if the
officer receiving the complaint does not thoroughly document

262. Brandi Kruse, Report: Seattle Police Officers Rarely Use Force Against
People in Crisis, Q13FOX. COM (Sept. 7, 2015, 5:33 PM), http://q13fox.com/
2015/09/07/report-seattle-police-officers-rarely-use-force-against-people-in-crisis.
263. NORTON ET AL., supra note 195, at 11.
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and report it to the investigating body, any hope of a fair and
complete investigation is compromised from the outset.264
A simple solution to these concerns is authorizing
independent review agencies to handle the initial intake for
all civilian complaints. These agencies should make the
complaint-reporting process as easy as possible for civilians,
and allow people to report complaints in person or by mail,
email, telephone, fax, or via a complaint form on the agency’s
website.265 In case civilians do not know to file their
complaints with the independent review agency, police
departments themselves should be required to post
information in every police station, detention center, and
courthouse about how to file a complaint, and to provide the
appropriate information when asked by a civilian. Cities
should also require police officers by law to notify the
independent review agency of any civilian complaint that is
made to an officer.266 While it may take some time and effort
to educate the public about the options available to them for
filing complaints, the end goal is a robust and recognized
review agency that civilians immediately seek out when
misconduct occurs.
D. Independent Review Agencies Should Be Responsible for
Tracking Early Warning Signs of Misconduct, and
Reporting It to the Public
In many police departments, a small minority of officers
account for a disproportionate percentage of misconduct. 267
Early intervention systems, which typically take the form of
software allowing authorized users to track the number and
type of complaints incurred by a particular officer, can
identify these officers early in their career and allow police
264. See NEW ORLEANS INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at 86.
265. Simmons, supra note 96, at 515.
266. I recommend imposing a reporting requirement by law because the
alternative—trusting police departments to informally cooperate with review
agencies in reporting complaints—has proven unsuccessful. See, e.g., supra notes
86-89 and 183-84 and accompanying text (discussing reporting failures by Denver
Sheriff’s Department and Seattle Police Department).
267. SEATTLE INVESTIGATION, supra note 121, at 4.
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departments—and review agencies—to pay closer attention
to these officers.268 Early intervention software can also track
a variety of other officer activities, including documented
uses of force, stops, and arrests.269
Although some police departments have early
intervention systems in place, they have been decidedly lax
in utilizing those systems. Albuquerque, for example, has an
early intervention system, but it is effectively useless. The
system tracks only limited types of misconduct, and has
absurdly high thresholds for the number of warnings an
officer can incur before triggering serious intervention.270
When Albuquerque police officer Sean Wallace shot and
killed an unarmed man in 2011, the public learned only after
the fact that this was Wallace’s third shooting of an unarmed
civilian. Wallace had killed his first victim in 2004, and
wounded another in 2010, but received no discipline for
either of these prior incidents.271
If an independent review agency is responsible for intake
of all civilian complaints, then the agency is also in the best
position to track officers with repeat complaints. Using an
early intervention system to track these officers would allow
a review agency to recommend (or require) additional
training for officers who are the subject of complaints, or
identify them within the department to discourage the
identified officers (as well as their colleagues) from future
misconduct.272 It would also help the review agency identify
which officers deserve serious discipline or termination for
their misconduct: an officer who has had multiple complaints
and continued his behavior should be removed from the force,
268. NEWARK INVESTIGATION, supra note 49, at 43.
269. CLEVELAND INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at 47; see also U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, PROMOTING COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES TO REDUCE RACIAL PROFILING 7-8
(2008), http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p146-pub.pdf (discussing the
procedures and potential benefits of early intervention for new police officers).
270. ALBUQUERQUE INVESTIGATION, supra note 62, at 29.
271. Id. at 12; Astrid Galvan, Shooting Was Police Officer’s Third,
ALBUQUERQUE J. (May 12, 2011), http://www.abqjournal.com/news/metro/
122256556202newsmetro05-12-11.htm.
272. See Simmons, supra note 53, at 396-97.
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whereas an officer’s first complaint may, depending on the
type of misconduct, deserve less serious discipline.
In addition to tracking the number of complaints filed
against each individual officer, review agencies should also
report this information to the public (even if they are
prohibited by law from identifying the officer by name). The
Chicago Council of Lawyers, a bar association devoted to
public interest law, has already called on Chicago’s
Independent Police Review Authority to make available
information that would allow the public to identify how many
complaints each individual officer has received.273 The Review
Authority’s current practice is to issue quarterly reports
listing the number of complaints each officer in a given
district received during that quarter, without identifying the
officers by name. The Review Authority does not, however,
provide any means of tracking whether that same officer
continued to receive complaints after the three-month period
had passed, nor does it indicate whether those complaints
were sustained.274 I recommend requiring review agencies to
issue annual reports indicating the number of complaints
individual officers receive each year, what types of
complaints each officer received, and a short summary of the
factual allegations, as well as how many complaints against
each officer were sustained, and a more detailed description
of the sustained complaints. This would alert the public to
repeat-offender officers and hold the police department
accountable for keeping those officers on the force.
The White House has also recognized the importance of
tracking civilian complaints and invested money and effort
into reforming early warning systems by making the
information obtained more accessible to the public. The
White House-sponsored Police Data Initiative, which began
in 2015, recruits police departments that agree to submit
their data archives on police-citizen encounters to outside
researchers for analysis and suggestions on how the data can
273. CHICAGO COUNCIL OF LAWYERS, CHICAGO NEEDS TO REPORT MORE
COMPREHENSIVE DATA ABOUT HOW IT PROCESSES MISCONDUCT COMPLAINTS
AGAINST POLICE OFFICERS 4-5. (2015), http://files.ctctcdn.com/48087546001/
8e90e9e6-e26c-42fd-adb0-768de52ce936.pdf.
274. Id. at 4.
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be used to reform police departments and eliminate officers
who engage in repeated misconduct.275 Although the
initiative is in its early stages, it may hold promise for
independent review agencies as well.
E. Independent Review Agencies Should Have Authority to
Investigate All, Rather than a Limited Subset of,
Civilian Complaints
Some independent review agencies are hampered in their
efforts to reform police departments because they are
authorized to review only certain types of misconduct. New
York’s Civilian Complaint Review Board, for example, cannot
review any complaints regarding false statements or perjury
by police officers, even though the police department has a
significant problem with officers making false statements,
and the department’s Internal Affairs Unit has not solved the
issue.276 Chicago’s Independent Police Review Authority
investigates misconduct complaints alleging improper use of
force, bias-based policing, domestic violence, and officerinvolved shootings, but leaves the remainder of complaints to
the police department’s Bureau of Internal Affairs.277 Even
Cincinnati’s Citizen Complaint Authority, earlier cited as a
model for agencies seeking to incorporate a wide array of
citizens in the review process, is authorized to investigate
only “serious interventions by police officers, including but
not limited to shots fired, deaths in custody and major uses
of force.”278
Restricting review agencies in this way hinders their
efforts to achieve meaningful reform. While officer-involved
shootings are tragically prevalent and certainly deserve
independent investigation, many civilian complaints involve
275. See Andrew Tarantola, White House Launches Police Data Initiative,
ENGADGET (May 18, 2015), http://www.engadget.com/2015/05/18/white-houselaunches-the-police-data-initiative; see also Megan Smith & Roy Austin,
Launching the Police Data Initiative, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (May 18, 2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/05/18/launching-police-data-initiative.
276. See N.Y.C. CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., supra note 188, at x-xi, 39-45.
277. SAFER ET AL., supra note 186, at 57; see also CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 2-57
(2007) (establishing IPRA).
278. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUN. CODE art. 27, § 1 (2002).
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more mundane issues like discourtesy and verbal abuse or
threats, which may not rise to the level of “major uses of
force,” but nonetheless seriously impede the police
department’s relationship with the community. Where police
departments have proven consistently ineffective in
addressing even these lesser forms of misconduct,
independent review agencies should be authorized to review
all complaints instead of a limited subset.
F. Independent Review Agencies Must Have Sufficient
Investigative Power to Effectively Review Complaints
For some agencies, the obstacle lies not in what
complaints they are authorized to review, but whether they
can effectively review those complaints. Many independent
review agencies lack subpoena power, and instead must base
their investigations and conclusions almost entirely on
whatever information the police department chooses to give
them. Review agencies should have subpoena power. They
should also have a presumption of access to all police files;
cities should require police departments to disclose all
requested files, with the only possible exception being in
camera review by a court if the police department objects.279
Cities should also require police officers to cooperate with
independent review investigations. The Cincinnati
Collaborative Agreement is an example of this. The
Agreement provides that, as a condition of employment, all
police officers and city employees are required to provide
truthful and accurate information to the Citizen Complaint
Authority when asked.280 In cases where an officer might be
279. As I mention in Part III.C, supra, many review agencies as they are
currently structured have to contend with state or city laws prohibiting public
access to police records. Although a strong case could be made that these laws
should be amended or simply eliminated, that is an article for another day. For
now, I note simply that lawmakers creating the review agencies should explicitly
authorize these agencies to access police files, and exempt agencies from the
prohibitions on access that apply to most members of the public.
280. Collaborative Agreement at 21, In re Cincinnati Policing, 209 F.R.D. 395
(S.D. Ohio 2002) (No. C-1-99-317); see also United States v. City of Ferguson, No.
4:16-cv-000180-CDP (E.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2016), at 89 (creating a duty of candor in
Ferguson police officers to provide truthful answers in “all matters and official
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subject to criminal penalties, the review agency may choose
not to compel an officer’s testimony, because that testimony
could subsequently be immunized from use in criminal
prosecution.281 But criminal prosecutions are a rare subset of
misconduct cases, and the agency should at least have the
option of requiring accused officers to cooperate in the
investigation. Enforcing such requirements could go a long
way toward solving the problem of review agencies
hamstrung by resistance from police departments.
Independent review agencies should also participate in
the immediate response to high-profile investigations, as
soon as an incident involving potentially serious police
misconduct occurs. Denver’s Office of the Independent
Monitor, for example, is authorized to come to the scene of an
officer-involved shooting, before any complaints are even
reported, and assist in determining whether a crime
occurred.282 Denver’s civilian monitors also observe all video
interviews of witnesses to the shooting, and can provide
additional questions for the officers to ask during the
interview.283 In this way, the monitors provide civilian
oversight as soon as the investigation starts, and reduce the
all-too-common scenario in which the inquiry into a
controversial incident like an officer-involved shooting is
corrupted from the outset by departmental bias.284

investigations relating to the scope of their employment,” under penalty of
termination).
281. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (providing that compelled
testimony for use in administrative proceedings may be immunized from use in
criminal prosecutions). For a discussion of the problems associated with Garrity
immunity, see generally Steven D. Clymer, Compelled Statements from Police
Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1309 (2001).
282. DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, supra note 87, at 47.
283. Id.
284. Ideally, independent review agencies should be solely responsible for
investigation of officer-involved shootings with no police involvement at all, but
at a minimum any police investigation should be done by an outside police
department. Currently only two states, Wisconsin and Connecticut, require
investigations of officer-involved shootings to be handled by police departments
other than the one from which the shooting officer hails. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §
51-277a (2015); WIS. STAT. §175.47 (2014); Holly Yan & Ashley Fantz, Police Kill
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G. Independent Review Agencies Should Avoid Stringent
Requirements Regarding Who Can File Complaints and
When
As discussed in Part III, many independent review
agencies are bound by statutes or regulations that govern,
and in many cases restrict, the way they conduct their
investigations. For example, some agencies are allowed to
pursue investigations only if the complainant will sign a
sworn affidavit; in the absence of such an affidavit the agency
cannot continue the investigation, and the complaint is
automatically dismissed.285 Others will not proceed without a
signed complaint, and still others have ninety-day reporting
deadlines; a complaint made more than ninety days after the
alleged incident will not be accepted or investigated.286 Many
of these rules have the (intended or unintended) effect of
drastically reducing the number of complaints that can be
sustained against police officers.
Cities should authorize review agencies to proceed with
investigations in the absence of an affidavit or signed
complaint, or even the name of the complainant. Particularly
in cases involving threats or abuse by police officers, it is easy
to understand why some complainants are not comfortable
providing their full names and a sworn complaint. A recent
report on the St. Louis County Police Department warned
that the department may be limiting civilian complaints even
by putting a signature line on the complaint form—
suggesting that the complaint must be signed before filing—
and also by failing to inform the public that anonymous
complaints are permitted.287 The report recommended that
the signature line be removed and that all printed material,

Teen: Why Wisconsin’s Investigation Will Be Different, CNN (Mar. 10, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/10/us/wisconsin-police-shooting-rules.
285. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
286. ALBUQUERQUE INVESTIGATION, supra note 62, at 38-39, 43.
287. NORTON ET AL., supra note 195, at 8-9, 102.
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as well as the department’s website, make clear that
anonymous complaints will be accepted.288
Cities should also eliminate strict deadlines for filing of
complaints. In Cincinnati, the Citizen Complaint Authority
is authorized to review complaints submitted within one year
of the date of an incident; even complaints submitted after
that one-year period may still be reviewed in the discretion
of the Executive Director.289 Although a relatively small
number of complaints may be filed more than ninety days
after the complained-of conduct, one can easily imagine good
reasons for letting those complaints be reviewed: for
example, if the complainant was arrested during the
complained-of incident, and had no opportunity to report the
misconduct until after he was released.
H. Independent Review Agencies Should Have Authority to
Impose Discipline, Rather than Make Recommendations
the Police Department Is Free To Reject
Authorizing independent review agencies to impose
discipline would be a significant step toward enforcing the
kinds of reform that police departments themselves are so
reluctant to adopt. In early 2015, the mayor of Newark, New
Jersey, Ras Baraka, formed a Civilian Complaint Review
Board believed to be the first independent review agency
authorized to impose discipline that the police department
cannot, except in rare circumstances, refuse.290 When
Newark’s Civilian Complaint Review Board substantiates a
complaint against an officer and proposes discipline, the
police department must impose that discipline unless the
police chief appears in person and convinces the Board that
its decision was erroneous.291

288. Police officers themselves, of course, rely heavily on anonymous complaints
in investigating criminal activity. E.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 326-28
(1990).
289. CITY OF CINCINNATI CITIZEN COMPLAINT AUTH., supra note 239, at 11.
290. Ross, supra note 241.
291. See id.; see also Newark, N.J. Exec. Order, supra note 241.
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Although Newark’s model is untested, it holds great
promise. Currently, most independent review agencies
recommend only minor discipline for major problems, likely
because they know the police department is less likely to
follow their recommendations if the discipline is severe.292 To
create true reform, serious misconduct must be met with
appropriate discipline. Untruthfulness, for example, is an
enormous problem in police departments across the country:
police officers have a deserved reputation for covering up for
their colleagues at almost any cost, even when major
misconduct has occurred. A recent report assessing Chicago’s
Independent Police Review Authority suggested that, when
the agency finds that a police officer “deliberately concealed
or failed to disclose information” about a fellow officer’s
misconduct, the agency should automatically recommend
dismissal from the force.293 The DOJ came to the same
conclusion in Ferguson, recommending that officers found to
have been untruthful in the performance of their duties,
including responding to misconduct investigations, be
terminated.294 The same harsh discipline is needed for proven
incidents of racial bias or discrimination. There is no excuse
for racially-biased or discriminatory policing, and its
prevalence on police forces is a testament only to how
unacceptably long police departments have tolerated such
pernicious prejudice.
Resistance by police departments and unions to civilian
oversight can be expected, particularly when the civilian
review agency is authorized to actually impose discipline,
rather than merely make recommendations. In Newark,
after the city council approved creation of the Civilian
Complaint Review Board, the police union immediately
responded by saying that it intended to file a lawsuit
challenging the authority of the Board.295 But Newark is
combating this resistance by emphasizing the widespread
292. See supra pp. 880-81 (detailing the minor discipline recommended by
Chicago’s Independent Police Review Authority, and the numerous options police
officials and the officers under review have for disregarding or appealing those
recommendations).
293. SAFER ET AL., supra note 186, at 4-5, 23.
294. FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 33, at 96.
295. Porter, supra note 181.
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support that the Civilian Complaint Review Board enjoys at
both the national and local level. Before the city council voted
on the Civilian Complaint Review Board, twenty-six national
and local civilian organizations, including Black Lives
Matter, the Boys and Girls Club of Newark, the New Jersey
Working Families Alliance, numerous Latino organizations,
and even the National Organization of Black Law
Enforcement Executives, signed a letter in support of the
Board.296 Mayor Baraka and Newark’s Public Safety Director
also read statements in support of the Board.297 The city
council approved the Review Board in a unanimous vote, and
after the police union threatened a lawsuit, Mayor Baraka
encouraged the police to “embrace the opportunity the board
would offer to increase transparency and accountability.”298
The union has not yet followed through on its threat to sue.
Relatedly, when review agencies find that an officer’s
misconduct rose to the level of a crime, they should be
allowed to require that a special prosecutor, who does not
have a working relationship with the police department or
officer under investigation, be appointed to determine
whether criminal charges are appropriate. Prosecutions of
police officers are extremely rare. Over a five-year period
from 2010 to 2014 the Albuquerque Police Department
managed to kill twenty-eight people (a per-capita kill rate
eight times that of the New York Police Department), and
until 2014 not one of the officers involved in those twentyeight killings had been charged with any crime.299 The
District Attorney’s office in New Orleans also routinely
refuses to prosecute police officers who commit crimes. In one
particularly disturbing example, the office twice declined to
296. Newark Makes History with Council’s Passage of Permanent Police
Oversight Board, ACLU N.J. (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.aclunj.org/news/2016/03/16/newark-makes-history-councils-passage-permanentpolice-overs.
297. Id.
298. Porter, supra note 181.
299. Nick Pinto, When Cops Break Bad: Inside a Police Force Gone Wild,
ROLLING STONE (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/
features/when-cops-break-bad-albuquerque-police-force-gone-wild20150129?page=2.
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prosecute a New Orleans police officer accused of indecent
behavior with a juvenile and rape; the officer remained on the
police force until he was accused in a third case of forcibly
raping and molesting a juvenile, and finally charged.300 In
Cincinnati, the 2015 murder indictment of University of
Cincinnati officer Ray Tensing, for the shooting death of
Samuel DuBose, was the first time any officer in the county
had ever been charged with murder for killing a civilian while
on duty.301 Given prosecutors’ cowardly track records when it
comes to filing charges against police officers, and the close
relationship they often have with the officers they are called
upon to prosecute, review agencies should have authority to
appoint a special prosecutor when they find that officers have
committed criminal misconduct.
The Ferguson Commission report made this point,
recommending that independent review agencies be “[a]ble
and authorized to investigate potential criminal wrongdoing
by officers and to make recommendations for prosecutions
that are then evaluated by special prosecutors.”302 These
kinds of reforms could be a significant step toward
eliminating the lethargy and institutional bias that has
allowed misconduct to proliferate, but they will not be
possible if the findings of the review agency are only
suggestions. Agencies must be given power to enforce their
findings.
CONCLUSION
After Samuel DuBose—an unarmed black man pulled
over for a minor traffic violation—was shot and killed by
Cincinnati police officer Ray Tensing in July of 2015,
Hamilton County Prosecutor Joe Deters almost immediately

300. NEW ORLEANS INVESTIGATION, supra note 48, at 94.
301. Richard Pérez-Peña, University of Cincinnati Officer Indicted in Shooting
Death of Samuel Dubose, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/07/30/us/university-of-cincinnati-officer-indicted-in-shootingdeath-of-motorist.html?_r=0.
302. FERGUSON COMM’N, supra note 114, at 28.
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vowed to charge Tensing with murder.303 Deters’s blunt
determination took some by surprise. In his press conference
announcing his decision to file murder charges, he told the
gathered crowd, “look . . . we’re gonna follow the law in this
office and we are going, if the facts fit the law, we’re gonna
pursue that no matter if you’re a police officer or you’re Pope
Francis, I don’t care who you are, we’re gonna go after you.”304
Officer Tensing’s criminal case has not yet been resolved,
and it remains to be seen whether he will be convicted for
DuBose’s murder. But the promise Deters’s statement
embodies—that police officers who mistreat civilians will not
get away with it simply because of their status or office—is a
sadly elusive one for many people, particularly the minorities
who are so disproportionately victims of police misconduct.
Our nation’s police departments desperately need to be
reformed. That reform must take place on many levels, but
one piece of it is ending—at long last—the practice of trusting
police departments to police themselves.

303. WCPO, Ray Tensing, Samuel DuBose: Hamilton County Prosecutor Joe
Deters Discusses Murder Indictment, YOUTUBE (July 29, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TrSfVk-tqug.
304. Id.

